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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate participants’  perceived  value  and  effect  of grassroots 
level dialogue facilitated between Israelis and Palestinians. The fieldwork was conducted in 
Israel and Palestine from October to December 2009. During the fieldwork 24 qualitative 
semi-structured interviews were carried out with 13 Israeli and 11 Palestinian participants. 
The interviewees were associated with five different dialogue groups. Each dialogue group 
varied in contents, structures as well as types of people associated.  
 
This thesis argues that diplomacy and negotiations at the political level alone will fail to solve 
the deep-rooted Israeli and Palestinian conflict. In order to secure a sustainable peace, a 
bottom-up process of change must occur, which addresses the psychological barriers that 
contribute to deepen the division between the two sides. However, conducting grassroots 
dialogue in an ongoing violent conflict is challenging, especially with regards for the 
asymmetrical power relation between the conflicting groups, where one side is occupied 
(Palestine) and the other side is being the occupier (Israel). Different realities often result in 
different motivations and expectations of the dialogue meetings, which in turn can cause 
significant challenges and in worst cases make the divide even greater. For this reason 
several scholars argue that grassroots dialogue is not fruitful until after the occupation has 
ended.  
 
Thesis findings indicate that all of the interviewed participants experienced a significant 
personal value from dialogue. The majority expressed that dialogue have been effective in 
adjusting their negative stereotypes and prejudice of one another, and have contributed to 
the recognition of the others as human beings. Findings also indicate that dialogue helps to 
build a shared reality between the participants, where both peoples are included in the 
vision of a peaceful solution for the region. This is what reconciliation is aiming for, and one 
may therefore claim that reconciliation actually happens in small ways. Another finding 
presented in this thesis is that participants are frustrated due to dialogue’s  limited  impact  on  
the political situation. Israeli and Palestinian grassroots dialogue groups have existed for 
many years, but the positive effect on a personal level has not yet succeeded to generalize 
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to the macro level of the whole society. This thesis suggests several reasons for why it has 
not yet happened; limited ability to embrace a broader spectrum of people, as well as 
limited/absent cooperation between the grassroots and the political level in both societies 
are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The Palestinian – Israeli conflict has been at the center of the world’s attention for more 
than a century. Despite the many attempts for peaceful resolution it still remains 
unresolved. The conflict is described as intractable, deep-rooted, long lasting, and it has 
caused extensive psychological and material costs to both sides. It is colored by an endless 
act of hostility and violence, which have had destructive consequences for both the 
Palestinian and Israeli societies. Almost every single family on both sides has experienced 
suffering and loss due to the harsh violence. While destructive conflicts generate great 
amounts of pain and suffering, they also give seed to groups that are trying to end the 
conflict in a peaceful way. While working as an international volunteer in Palestine in 2007, I 
had the privilege become acquainted with several courageous peace activists that work for 
grassroots dialogue between the two peoples, despite the seemingly hopeless situation. 
They became a real inspiration and gave me hope that an Israeli and Palestinian peace one 
day might be possible. It also made me curious in finding out more about grassroots 
dialogue as an approach to reconciliation between deeply segregated societies.  
 
1.1. Purpose of the study  
The purpose of this study is to examine different groups that employ grassroots dialogue 
methods to foster reconciliation through increased empathy and understanding between 
the two civil societies. The reasons for choosing this subject is to gain a deeper 
understanding of how dialogue as a reconciliation method can succeed (or fail) to unite 
people in an ongoing violent conflict.  
 
There is a common belief that traditional diplomacy among political leaders alone will fail to 
solve intractable conflicts. In order to solve such conflicts, multilayered methods must be 
taken in use that also address the psychological barriers that contribute to the deep division 
of the conflicting parts. Such barriers might be visible through mutual prejudice and 
dehumanization of one another. It might also be visible in the development of contradicting 
historical narratives, which describes the conflict in such ways that it neglects the other 
side’s  perceptive,  and  in  some  cases  neglect  their very right of existence. There is therefore 
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reason to believe that a bottom-up process of change in relations must occur in order to 
ensure a sustainable peace, and not only impose peace agreements in a top-down fashion. 
Dialogue is a reconciliation tool that aims to replace hostile attitudes and bring people closer 
together. However, such grassroots dialogue has existed between Israelis and Palestinians 
for several generations without any obvious effect on the conflict. So does really grassroots 
dialogue have any effect in improving the relations between segregated societies, and does 
it really help solving the overall conflict?  
 
1.2.  Problem statement and objectives  
The problem statement of this thesis is:  
 
To gain a greater understanding of participants’  perceived  value  and  effect  by 
grassroots level dialogue in Israel and Palestine.   
 
An illustration of the problem statement is performed through an analysis of 24 semi-
structured interviews of Israeli and Palestinian participants in dialogue groups. This is 
supported by as much attendance and observation as possible in the different dialogue 
groups. The thesis will look at the different motives, experiences and perceptions of the 
participants that take part in grassroots dialogue. Through their viewpoints the thesis is 
attempting to gain a better understanding of whether dialogue actually does make a 
difference in the relations between the conflicting sides. It also attempts to find out whether 
participants perceive that grassroots dialogue can have any significant effect on the road to 
peace. This thesis is formulated into two different research objectives, which are defined as 
follows:  
 
Objective I: To understand participants’ self-declared motivations for becoming 
involved in grassroots dialogue.  
 
Objective II: To understand how the participants experience the value and effect from 
participation in grassroots level dialogue. - It will focus on two different areas, one is 
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the impact it might have for the participants on a personal level, and the other is the 
effect it might have on the outside political reality.  
 
This thesis is distinctive from other research that has been performed on similar topics. 
While there are many papers on single-case dialogue, there is less research to be found 
comparing participants from multiple sets of dialogue groups. I have therefore chosen to 
include participants from five different dialogue groups that vary in structure, content and in 
the types of people connected to them. While some of the groups are political, others steer 
away from political differences and rather focus on things that the two peoples have in 
common. One of the groups is based on youth, while another is a pure women’s  group. 
Some of the encounters are short-term workshops, while others are based on long-term 
commitment. Receiving experience from several approaches will hopefully provide a 
broader picture of the different perceptions and aspirations that exist towards the use of 
grassroots dialogue as a reconciliation tool.  
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis  
The following will give a short outline of the thesis in order make the reader familiar with the 
main issues. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework, where the most essential 
concepts are defined. This includes concepts concerning intractable conflicts, social identity 
and its relation to conflict, reconciliation, as well as grassroots level dialogue. Chapter 3 gives 
a historical background of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict through presenting the most 
essential opposing historical narratives that have been developed during the conflict.  
Chapter 4 describes the methods that I have used in my research, and the reasons behind 
my choices. Chapter 5 gives a deeper description of the five dialogue groups and their goals 
and contents. It also gives a description of the 24 interviewed participants that have been 
chosen for the research. Chapters 6 and 7 present and discuss the findings in relation to the 
theories. Chapter 6 gives a presentation on participants’ prior stereotypes and hence their 
motivation for becoming involved in dialogue. Chapter 7 presents and discusses the 
participants’  perception  of the value and effect of grassroots dialogue. Chapter 8 
summarizes the main findings and presents some concluding remarks.  
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2. Conceptual foundation  
 
This chapter presents a theoretical framework for the thesis by defining and discussing 
several relevant concepts. Of these, intractable conflict, social identity and structural 
asymmetry form the basis. The concept of reconciliation is also discussed, as well as the use 
of grassroots dialogue and its different contents. 
 
2.1. Intractable conflict 
Conflict is an integrated part of every human interaction. It has the potential to break out if 
individuals or groups are in position of opposing interest and goals (Bar-Tal 2000). Some 
conflicts are resolved constructively trough negotiations, while others seem to elude 
resolution and take a more destructive path. The latter kind can be referred to as protracted, 
intractable and deep-rooted (Coleman 2006). Intractable conflicts are common in  today’s  
society and can occur between individuals, groups or nations (Coleman 2006) Some of the 
key characteristics of intractable conflicts are that they persist for long periods of time, have 
a high level of violence, as well as resisting all effort of constructive resolution (Coleman 
2006). Every aspect in social life is affected, and both sides have a perception that it is a 
struggle for their survival (Handelman 2011).  It is often perceived as a zero-sum game in the 
sense that both sides believe that what the opponent gains, they will loose (Crocker et al. 
2005). Another key characteristic of intractable conflicts is their internal nature, in the sense 
that conflicting groups are often geographically very close (Lederach 2004). Members of the 
groups therefore often have direct experiences of violence. In addition, it may contribute to 
a higher degree of fear and animosity to know that the enemy lives next door and not on the 
other side of the globe (Lederach 2004). As time passes, a prolonged and violent 
confrontation can have a major influence on the psychological dimensions of the society 
members that are involved (Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005). People that live under such harsh 
environments often struggle with stress and can be exposed to both material and human 
exhaustion (Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005). It is not an unusual tendency that members of each 
society construct their respective reality based on distrust, animosity, and de-legitimization 
of the opponent (Bar-Tal & Nets-Zehngut 2007). The high level of violence often reinforces 
the deep-rooted animosity. After a while it is therefore common that psychological features 
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drive and sustain the conflict more than substantive issues. As  Lederach  argues:  “  (…)  cycle 
of violence and counter violence becomes the cause of perpetuating the conflict, especially 
where  groups  have  experienced  mutual  animosity  for  decades,  if  not  generations” 
(Lederach 2004: 15). The following will therefore consider the dimensions of social 
psychology and the role of social identity in intractable conflicts.    
 
2.2. Social identity 
In several sociological discourses there is often defined a separation between the individual 
identity and the social identity (Jenkins 1996). This thesis is based on the assumption that 
the relationship between these types of identities is to a great degree interlinked, in the 
sense that the selfhood is only meaningful in the connection with the social world. One 
definition of the term social identity is provided by Richard Jenkins, who writes: “  It  refers  to  
the ways in which individuals and collectives are distinguished in their social relations with 
other individuals and collectives”  (Jenkins 1996 : 4). When placing oneself and others into 
different social categories it becomes easier to navigate in the myriads of impressions 
people daily receive from the social environment. It is common for individuals to establish 
memberships to a multiple set of social categories (Sen 2006). Examples of such can be 
religion, gender, age, nationality and ethnicity. It can also be teacher, father, or a student. 
When people ask about who you are, it is a tendency that people answer based on a specific 
group  belonging.  Such  as  “I  am  a  Palestinian”,  or  “I  am  a  teacher”.  Such  boundaries between 
outsiders and insiders may traditionally have been perceived more or less as fixed entities. 
However, according to the post-modernistic notion, these boundaries are to a great degree 
socially constructed, and also something that can be deconstructed as a natural process in 
life (Jenkins 1996). It is only when a collective of individuals share the idea that they are 
members of a social group, together with an emotional attachment to that specific 
membership, a social category can exist (Ashmore et al. 2001). The social-identity theory 
(SIT) presented by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (Tajfel & Turner 1986) is of relevance for 
understanding people’s urge for such group formation. It claims that a positive self-image is 
a natural part of human life, and a major part of our sense of ourselves, anchored in the 
groups  to  which  we  belong.  For  the  individual’s  self-esteem it is therefore necessary with 
social comparisons where the in-group is more favorable than the out-group.  
6  
 
Shared societal beliefs can be regarded as an important factor for social identities to exist 
(Bar-Tal et al. 2004). Societal beliefs are defined as multiple sets of convictions and ideals 
shared by the group members (Bar-Tal et al. 2004). Several scholars have used different 
terms for these beliefs that are shared by identity groups, such as societal beliefs, group 
beliefs systems, collective narratives and collective memories (Bar-Tal et al. 2004).  Societal 
beliefs include among others shared history, language, myths, narratives, and group goals 
(Bar-Tal et al. 2004). These shared beliefs may create more confidence and a sense of 
similarity and unity among the members, and hence contribute to the development of a 
shared social identity.  
 
2.2.1. Identity and violence  
Incompatibilities between social identities do not necessarily develop into violent conflicts. 
Groups with different sets of political views or religions can, and often do, live together 
peacefully (Fisher 2006). However, in some contexts it can be a source of violence, and the 
following will outline some factors that can contribute to a hostile and conflicting 
relationship between different identity groups.  
 
The relationship between conflict and identity is considered as mutual and complex. On one 
hand, elements related to identity can collide and cause conflict, while on the other hand 
intense conflict spanning over several decades can have a great effect on group identity.  
There is often a separation between identity conflicts and material conflicts. A material 
conflict can be defined as disputes “over  ‘real’ material assets such as territory, water, oil, 
border,  security,  and  the  like” (Auerbach 2010: 99). Conflict over identity, on the other hand, 
can be referred to as a conflict were one or both sides regard  the  other’s  social  identity  as  a  
threat to its own existence (Auerbach 2010). Some examples of such may be national and 
religious identities. According to realistic-conflict theory (RCT) there is a tendency that an 
identity conflict begins with a real material conflict of interests (Fisher 1990). When a 
material conflict spans over an extensive period of time it is a great risk for it to develop into 
an identity conflict, -which  is  considered  as  much  harder  to  resolve.    “What can begin as a 
competition between two groups over scarce resources may later be transformed into a 
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conflict over whose social identity  is  more  legitimate  or  worthy” (Nadler 2004: 21). On the 
other hand, social identity alone might be the main cause for violent conflicts (Maalouf 
1999). This  can  happen  when  a  group’s  societal  beliefs  and  the  chances  for  successfully  
reaching  the  group’s  goals  are  perceived  as  threatened  by  the  existence  of  another  group.  
When bargaining over these issues is considered in zero-sum term, identity alone is regarded 
as a real interest of conflict, just as much as the conflict over scarce resources.  
 
2.2.1.1. Societal beliefs around dehumanization and victimhood  
Stereotypes can be defined as generalizations people make about the characteristics of all 
members of a group (Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005). This is a societal phenomenon in any 
society, and they can be both positive and negative. However, in times of conflict, such 
generalizations are often problematic in the sense that they are colored by the harsh reality. 
The societal beliefs concerning the counterpart are often based on severe negative, 
incomplete and simplified stereotypes that easily lead to prejudice, discrimination and in the 
worst cases dehumanization of the other (Bar-Tal et al. 2004). According to Amin Maloof 
(1999) it is a tendency that identity conflicts not only lead to simplified generalizations of 
out-group, but also to a simplified sense of in-group. If e.g. followers of a religion feel that 
their ideology is threatened, it is a tendency for them to experience that their religious 
identity will dominate over other less threatened parts of their personality. He claims that 
this is a dangerous tendency. People who share the same opinion can seek together and 
develop an intolerant and biased view towards out-groups. “If  they  experience  that  the  other  
constitutes a threat against their origin, faith or nation, they can feel that everything that 
can  be  done  to  erase  this  threat  as  absolute  legitimate” (Maalouf 1999: 31). The Indian 
professor Amartya Sen supports this view. He claims: “a fostered sense of one identity of one 
group  of  people  can  be  made  into  a  powerful  weapon  to  brutalize  another” (Sen 2006: 1).  
 
According to Neil Caplan there is another societal belief that often develops in times of 
conflict and may serve as an obstacle to peace, which is societal belief around victimhood. 
“It is the set of competing, ingrained, and mutually exclusive self-images  many  (…)  have  of  
themselves  as  the  victim  of  the  other  party’s  aggressiveness  and  hostility” (Caplan 1999: 64). 
This societal belief is often problematic due to the fact that it can give a sense of feeling that 
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one is morally excused from the responsibility for what is going on in the conflict. Another 
obstacle may be that a self-concept of being a victim may also contribute to reduce the 
potentiality for empathy toward the other.  
 
2.2.1.2. Palestine and Israel – example of an intractable conflict 
The Palestinian Israeli conflict serves as a classical example of a contemporary intractable 
conflict. They live as neighbors and are locked into long-standing cycles of hostile interaction 
that have lasted for many centuries (Handelman 2011). The conflict is perceived as both 
identity-based as well as centered around material interests (Auerbach 2010). On one hand 
it can be perceived as a struggle over territory, resources and political control. On the other 
hand it can be related to social identity, in the sense that both groups experience a threat 
towards their group existence. The conflict is according to Herbert Kelman (2001) perceived 
in zero-sum terms, not only in terms of territory, but also in relations to social existence. 
Both sides tend to think that the other can ensure their social identity and rights only at the 
expense of their own identity and rights (Kelman 2001). Acknowledging  the  other’s  identity  
and rights might then be equal to risking the identity and the national existence of one’s 
own group. As a result of the harsh conflict it has been established several sets of negative 
societal beliefs on both sides, where some of them contribute to negatively stereotyping and 
dehumanizing the opponent (Bar-Tal et al. 2004). The beliefs often focus on the cruelty, 
violence,  and  the  other  sides’  lack  of  concern  for  human  life.  Both  groups  have  also  
developed a mutual sense of victimhood, where they both believe that the conflict was 
initiated and maintained by the other side (Bar-Tal et al. 2004). Such societal beliefs are 
widely spread and shared in a variety of channels, such as TV, radio, Internet, books, films, 
and in school curriculums. They have according to Daniel Bar-Tal become a part of the ethos 
of both societies, and are an important contribution to  people’s  social  identities (Bar-Tal et 
al. 2004).  
 
2.3. The aspect of asymmetry in intractable conflicts  
What often lacks in the social psychological approach to intractable conflict is the element of 
asymmetry. Significant numbers of intractable conflicts are characterized by deep 
asymmetries, which according to Oliver Rahmsbotham (2010) can lead to great challenges 
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for finding peaceful solutions. He defines asymmetric conflicts as “conflict  parties  that  are  
unequal in power, either quantitatively (e.g. strong vs. weak states) or qualitatively (e.g. 
state vs. non-state  actors)  or  both  “  (Ramsbotham 2010: 86). Gallo & Marzano (2009) makes 
a distinction between three types of asymmetrical conflicts: power asymmetry, strategic 
asymmetry and structural asymmetry.  Structural asymmetry is regarded as relative common 
in intractable conflicts, and exists when “there is  a  strong  imbalance  in  status”  between the 
conflicting parties (Gallo & Marzano 2009). Strong imbalance in power might also occur at 
the same time as structural asymmetry, and the conflict is often about trying to change the 
structure of relations between the opponents (Gallo & Marzano 2009). While the dominated 
party is fighting to change it, the dominator is often trying to avoid any change. In their 
article they use decolonization conflicts as an example of structural asymmetric conflicts, 
with focus on the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. 
 
There can be made a distinction between the subjective (perceptional) and objective 
(material) definitions of conflicts (Dudouet 2005). In terms of asymmetric power balance 
between the conflicting parties, one may direct focus to both the objective reality of power 
relations, as well as the perceptional view held by the actors. The Israeli and Palestinian 
conflict is considered as a structural asymmetrical power conflict. It is a classical example of 
a conflict where the two sides are unequal in situation or in power (Nasser et al. 2011). It is a 
great imbalance between the two sides in both the military, political and economic sphere. 
The Israeli side has among others a large-scale military power with the economic, political as 
well as military support from the USA. The other side, the Palestinians, have no access to the 
same military equipment; instead they use other strategies, such as rocket attacks and 
suicide bombing for conducting their operations. However, by a perceptional view both sides 
do more or less perceive themselves as the victims in he conflict. The mainstream Israeli 
representation of the conflict view Israel as the weakest part vis-à-vis the Arab world, which 
they believe is surrounding their small state trying to force them into the sea. However, in 
most imbalance conflicts, such as the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, it might be a tendency 
that the powerful part is less homogenous than the weaker part in their solidarity with their 
collective group. Not all Israeli members embrace the mainstream representation and do 
take a clear distance from the Israeli leadership. A more in depth description of the 
characteristics to the Israeli and Palestinian conflict is performed in chapter 3, through a 
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presentation of some of the perceptional opposing historical narratives that have been 
developed through several decades of violent actions.  
 
The complex nature of an asymmetric intractable identity-conflict that is perceived in zero-
sum terms is often challenging to resolve (Kelman 2001) (Gallo & Marzano 2009).  The 
conflicting issues often become a matter of life and death for both sides. Reaching 
agreements around division of a piece of land might often feel like giving up own groups’  
rights and identity. Solutions based on compromises are then often very hard to achieve. 
Even when specific issues in conflict are settled, these agreements may not lead to steady 
peace between the two parties unless they have created a new relationship based on 
acceptance  and  respect  for  each  other’s social identities. When a conflict also involves great 
difference in power balance there is reason to assume that it will make the resolution even 
harder, due to the fact that one must also work to reduce the power imbalance between the 
opponents. It is reason to believe that these conflicts need a multifaceted resolution-
approach that considers the conflict from various directions, dimensions and angles 
simultaneously.  
 
2.4. Reconciliation 
A multifaceted resolution approach that is widely embraced is reconciliation, and is, 
according to Oliver Ramsbotham (2005) the very heart of peacebuilding. The concept of 
reconciliation is an ambitious one with a wide range of definitions. Generally it can be 
referred to as the formation of a genuine and lasting peaceful relationship between societies 
that are involved in intractable conflicts, which have lasted for several decades, and that are 
colored by extensive violence (Ramsbotham et al. 2005). When such conflicts are allowed to 
endure for many years there are great danger for, as already outlined, an accumulation of 
animosity, development of severs negative stereotypes and prejudice. This again, can be 
incorporated into the ethos of the society. Attempts to end such conflicts often involve 
negotiation around incompatible goals, which according to Bar Tal is defined as a conflict 
mediating or resolution process (Bar-Tal 2000). However, resolution over conflicting goals 
can only be seen as a part of a long-term reconciliation process. In addition there must be a 
complementary bottom-up process with the development of a new psychological repertoire, 
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rooted  in  “…mutual trust and acceptance, cooperation ad consideration of mutual 
needs…”(Bar-Tal 2000: 351). A reconciliation process therefore seeks to improve the 
humanitarian relationship between the conflicting parts.  With the belief that relationship is 
both the basis of intractable conflicts, but also its long time solution the reconciliation 
process will focus on human relationships instead of separation (Lederach 2004). The 
Palestinian and Israeli conflict might be a classical example. A long lasting peace did not 
occur after the signing of the Oslo accords in the 1990s, which can be an indication of the 
need for a deeper social transformation (Doubilet 2007).   
 
 
2.4.1.   Three stages for reconciliation-Top, Middle, Grass-Root    
A greater recognition to multilayered peacebuilding can be illustrated by the work of John 
Paul Lederach (2004). Through his position as a professor in peacebuilding he claims that 
peace and reconciliation must contain more than a one-dimensional intervention between 
the top-political elites of the conflicting parties. Due to the multilayered picture of an 
intractable conflict, a rather comprehensive approach addressing both the visible but also 
the underlying structures that causes conflict must be applied. Lederach claims that a 
comprehensive approach needs to involve the entire population affected on both sides in 
order to succeed. This includes political and non-political actors at the top and grassroots 
level (Ramsbotham et al. 2005). Lederach uses a pyramid to illustrate various levels of 
peacebuilding. The apex, level one, is the narrowest level, containing the top political and 
military leaders. At this level he focuses on high-level negotiations, diplomacy, military, and 
political solutions (Lederach 2004). The middle range level, level two, consists of regional 
political actors, such as leaders in health and education sectors. They are far more numerous 
than level one actor, and are connected to both top and grassroots levels. Their networks of 
relationships are often cross cutting multiple identity divisions within a conflict. The 
grassroots level, level three, is the level that involves the masses of the society.  Refugee 
populations, displaced people, elderly, teenagers, and teachers are within this level. Within 
the two lowest levels of his triangle he stresses the importance of creating people-to-people 
programs in order to promote contact between societal actors. Amongst several activities 
described to promote this contact, is the use of grassroots dialogue. Actors in the different 
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levels of Lederach’s  pyramid  might  often  have different definitions of reconciliation. 
Politicians that have the responsibility for the top-down processes are often looking for 
short-term and measurable results, as they need to maintain their voters. The bottom-up 
activists, or academics, are usually more interested in long-term processes that can be more 
challenging to measure. With his pyramid Ledrach points out that peacebuilding is not an 
area limited to one level of society, but that all levels are interconnected and mutually 
dependent. Grassroots peace builders will often find it hard doing their work if not at least 
some steps at the political top level is being taken. On the other side, political solutions will 
lead nowhere if not being attended by the reconstruction in society.   
 
This multilayered view of peacebuilding is supported by the work of Harold H. Saunder 
(Saunder 2001).  Similar to Lederach he stresses the need for establishing processes within 
the societies that help people overcome the divided lines that fuel the continuation of the 
conflict. Saunder argues that signing an agreement between policymakers does not 
automatically make negative constructions within communities to disappear. In order to 
change the hostile attitudes against the other, he also stresses the importance of a bottom 
up process of change in relations. This, he claims, can be done through a “Public  Peace  
Process”, which is built around sustained dialogue in which citizens are empowered to 
change their societies.  
 
2.5. The Dialogue Approach  
Over several decades several techniques for building relationships between conflicting 
groups at grassroots level have been developed. Sustained face-to-face dialogue is an 
essential component of many of them. Dialogue is by Harold Saunders defined as “a  
systematic, prolonged dialogue among small groups of representative citizens committed to 
changing conflictual  relationships  (..)”  (Saunder 2001: 12). In general, dialogue can be 
described as a conversation between two or more people with different sets of opinions. It is 
more structured than an informal conversation, but it is less structured than formal 
mediation or negotiation. It has a purpose, destination and product. The aim is not to 
reverse each other, but only to exchange views (Nordhelle 2006).  Each side gets the 
opportunity to express them and listen to the other. Through this process they get the 
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chance to experience and emphasize with the views, feelings and values of the counterpart 
(Nordhelle 2006). Ideally, this can contribute to break down negative stereotypes on both 
sides. By meeting those who are regarded as enemies and perceiving them as human beings 
may structurally change the perception of the other and may challenge the discourse of 
hate. Not only can participants be transformed, but also those of the people around them, 
such as children and other community members when sharing their experiences. According 
to Sylvia Hurtado (2001) dialogue must be perceived as a process, rather than an event. This 
is due to the fact that it often requires a long-term commitment in order to develop new and 
broader understandings and insight.  
 
Dialogue encounters between Israeli and Palestinians civilians go all the way back to the late 
1950s (Abu-Nimer 1999). Interactive problem solving workshops, psychological workshops, 
track-two-diplomacy, supplemental diplomacy, multi-track diplomacy and interactive 
conflict resolution are some examples of the many variations to dialogue that have been 
applied. The dialogue encounters vary greatly, but still there can according to Mohammed 
Abu-Nimer (1999) be drawn into two major patterns:  
 Dialogue based on human-relations traditions 
 Dialogue based on conflict-resolution traditions.  
 
Human-relation tradition 
The human-relation tradition emerged after the Second World War and is based on Contact 
Hypothesis Theory, outlined in Gordon Allport’s book the “The nature  of  Prejudice”  (Abu-
Nimer 1999). The main belief in the 1950s was that bringing hostile groups together could be 
an effective means of reducing prejudice and improve inter-group relations (Doubilet 2007). 
It is rooted on the idea that the only thing people in a conflict need are a chance to get to 
know each other. Upon deeper knowledge of each other they will discover that beneath the 
surface of their group-belongings is a common and deeper identity, the identity of a human 
being (Nadler 2004). This idea forms the basis of several social programs around the world, 
such as ethnically integrated schools and racially mixed neighborhoods. In the setting of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict it has, and still does, create the foundation for several dialogue 
encounters. One example of such can be the Psychological/ Interpersonal Approach 
(Suleiman 2004b). Encounters based on the human-relation tradition do vary in many ways, 
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still there are some general characteristics that can be drawn (Halabi & Sonnenschein 2004). 
One characteristic is that encounters based on the human-relation tradition emphasize 
commonalities between the members, and are often shunting problematic political issues.  
The groups often emphasize cultural and religious commonalities such as food-traditions, 
hobbies, religion, and culture. Such as we both like to eat hummus, we both like to read the 
same types of books, or both religions have fasting as part of their rituals (the Muslim fast on 
Ramadan and the Jewish fast on Yom Kippur). Similar to the contact hypotheses this 
framework assumes that that the roots of prejudice lay in the lack of normalized inter-group 
contact (Halabi & Sonnenschein 2004). These types of encounters will therefore provide 
such contact, and having participants reduce their stereotypes by discovering that the other 
side consists of individuals with needs, and dreams just like them (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 
2007). Another characteristic is that the relation is often on an interpersonal level, which 
refers to the extent that people relate to each other on an individual basis (Doubilet 2007). 
The individual is in focus, rather than the group belonging. The assumption here is that 
hatred can be reduced only when you are cut off from your group attachments, and rather 
focus on pure personal contacts.   
 
Conflict- resolution tradition 
A series of critiques toward encounters based on the human-relation tradition has led to the 
development of other approaches, such as encounters based on a the conflict-resolution 
principles (Abu-Nimer 1999). Oliver Ramsbotham (2005) defines conflict resolution to be a 
transformation of institutions and discourses that reproduce violence. It must therefore be a 
transforming change in all underlying causes, behavior, and perceptions of the conflicting 
parties in order to create peace. According to Ronald Fisher (1997) is the role of a third party 
outmost central in conflict resolution. This is supported by Mohammed Abu-Nimer, which 
claims that a conflict resolution must entail “…the  use  of  collaborative  problem  solving in a 
situation where a neutral third party helps the disputants engage in conciliation, facilitation, 
and/or mediation…”  (Abu-Nimer 1999: 13). 
 
Dialogue accounts based on conflict-resolution tradition focus on the differences/conflicting 
issues rather than the commonalities (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007). There is an assumption 
that there is a basis in reality for the conflict between the two groups and that resolving it 
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requires a search for ways to build bridges between the conflicting goals. Representatives of 
this school of thought outline that there must be room to openly confront the political and 
emotional issues directly linked to the conflict, rather than oppressing them as seen in the 
human- relations tradition (Halabi & Sonnenschein 2004). Another characteristic is the use 
of intergroup interaction (Doubilet 2007). Intergroup interaction involves participants 
relating to each other via their group memberships, rather than representing themselves as 
individuals. An individual always speaks as a representative of his/her own group. The view 
is that the encounter will be useful and will reduce stereotypes not when the group identity 
of the participant is being minimized, but rather when it is encouraged and when the 
interaction that takes place are primary of a group nature. According to this approach, one 
may generalize from the personal experience in the encounter to the external reality as it is 
lived outside the dialogue group.  
 
The contemporary encounters between Israeli and Palestinians are influenced by the 
conflict-resolution tradition in different ways. One example of such is the public-peace 
ensembles that consists of short-term political workshops (Handelman 2011). Grassroots 
participants from the two sides represent  their  respective  group’s  interests,  and are sitting 
around a mediation table. It can be regarded as a preparation for a real official Palestinian-
Israeli assembly. Encounters can also consist of a mixture between both tradition (Doubilet 
2007). One can for example steer away from conflicting issues, influenced by human-relation 
traditions, where an example can be to plant a beautiful garden together. Instead of dividing 
the tasks between individuals, it is rather divided between the two group-identities, related 
to the conflict resolution.  Such as the Palestinians participants are planting olive trees and 
the Israeli participants are the diggers. The goal of planting a garden requires the 
cooperation of both groups, and the focus on categorization level is more likely to facilitate 
generalization  of  new  attitudes  to  the  group  as  whole.    It  is  not  “Fatima”,  but  “Palestinians”  
that are doing an excellent job in planting trees, and it is not Mikal but the Israeli that are 
good diggers.   
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2.5.1. A critique towards the use of dialogue in asymmetrical conflicts 
A general critique towards the dialogue models that are described above is that they in 
many cases fail to address the asymmetric power relation that often exists between the 
conflicting sides. While the conflict-resolution tradition to some degree addresses the 
different power relation between the parties, the human-relation approach is consciously 
avoiding this issue. Oliver Ramsbotham (2010) argues that conducting dialogue that fail in 
addressing the structural nature of asymmetry is perceived as more of a hindrance than of 
help. This is due to the fact that it is a great risk that it will only reinforce the position of the 
powerful part, the side that often want the situation to preserve more or less at it is. The 
Israeli author Rabah Halabi (2011) argues in similar terms as Oliver Ramsbotham. He claims 
that several dialogue encounters between Israelis and Palestinians fail in addressing the 
history of oppression between the dominator (Israel) and the dominated (Palestinians). He 
proposes that if one should conduct dialogue encounters between Israelis and Palestinians it 
must succeed to address the history of oppression between the two asymmetrical sides, 
rather than having facilitators who, according to his article, only see conflict resolution as 
group  dynamics  between  small  groups  of  people  in  a  more  “here  and  now”  situation.  If  
encounters take place it must mainly be the needs of the oppressed and occupied groups 
that must be heard. As he writes: “The  Palestinians  must  be  able  to  make  their  voices  heard  
in these encounters, even if muffled, as if from the depth of a dungeon. The Jews must be 
able to cope with their colonial  concepts  and  with  racism  (…) “ (Halabi 2011: 307).  
Other critical voices,  such  as  the  Palestinian  researcher  Nassif  Mu’allem,  argue that one 
must exclude any form for dialogue as long as the occupation is still going on (Hanafi 2007). 
Until the power relations are equalized one must rather focus on unilateral capacity building. 
The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) is arguing 
in similar terms, referring to the case of South Africa where dialogue and reconciliation was 
taken in use only after the end of apartheid (PACBI 2011). Sari Hanafi argues that 
cooperation might be an attempt on the Israeli side to escape their responsibility. She is 
quoted:  “While the Western and Israeli media focus their attention on these types of 
program, the number of settlers has increased three times since the launching of the peace 
process  “ (Hanafi 2007: 78). The Palestinian literature critic Edward Said proposes a similar 
criticism claiming that dialogue will only be of relevance after Palestinians have achieved 
their legitimized and national rights: “There  is  still  military  occupation,  people  are  being  
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killed, imprisoned and denied their rights on daily basis, so only when there has been an end 
to occupation and we are on a reasonably equal footing with the Israelis can we begin to talk 
seriously about  cooperation”  (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 295).  
 
2.5.1.1. Normalization  “tabi’a”   
Avoidance of the other is something that is deeply incorporated into both Palestinian and 
Israeli repertoire. It is physically visible in the Israeli building-constructions, such as the 
separation/apartheid wall, the strictly divided transportations systems and the myriad of 
checkpoints placed on the West Bank (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007). Invisibly it is deeply 
incorporated in societal codes and is often referred to as  normalization,  or  in  Arabic  “tabi’a”.  
Normalization can be defined as the process of building open relations with the other side 
(Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007). Especially Palestinians stigmatizes voluntary social contact with 
the enemy as negative, and something one must try to avoid, because it may help 
maintaining the state of occupation. The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural 
Boycott of Israel (PACBI) argues that “dialogue,  if  it  occurs  outside  the  resistance  framework  
(…)  becomes  dialogue for the sake of dialogue, which is a form of normalization that hinders 
the struggle to end injustice” (PACBI 2011).  
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3. Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of conflict  
 
This chapter will try to give some characteristics to the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. This 
will be done by presenting some of the opposing collective narratives that have been 
developed through several decades of violent actions.  
 
A common tendency of an intractable conflict is the evolvement of shared societal beliefs 
that are often referred to as narratives. These narratives tend to give a sense of uniqueness 
and meaning to the conflicting groups. Jerome Bruner defines a collective narrative as a: (…)  
sequence of historical  and  current  events;  they  are  accounts  of  a  community’s  collective  
experiences,  embodied  in  its  belief  system  and  represent  the  collective’s  symbolically  
constructed shared identity”(Bar-Tal & Salomon 2006: 20). In the Israeli Palestinian conflict, 
where peace has been nonexistent for generations, several sets of collective narratives have 
been developed, deeply rooted in fear and insecurity of the other side (Bar-Tal & Salomon 
2006). The narratives tend to be based upon historical memories of the conflict, and may or 
may not be historically true. The historical narratives are often presented in a way that gives 
support for own group’s  continued existence and social identity, while neglecting the 
opponents’  right  to  exist, or at least situating them in a very negative light. Therefore, a 
single historical event often contains multiple and opposing narratives based on which side 
that tells the story. Each perspective often places its own experience in the foreground, 
while neglecting the other side. According to Daniel Bar-Tal (2004) there are specifically 
three narrating beliefs that are in direct opposition to each other in the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict. These are: 
1) Societal beliefs  about  the  just  nature  of  one’s  goal 
2) Creating a negative image of the opponent, and  
3) Victimization.  
 
Both groups feel that they are the rightful owner of the land; each side claims that it has 
been suffering the most, and each side regards the other side as a terrorist state that is not 
interested in peace (Bar-Tal et al. 2004). 
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Not all people within each society embrace or identify themselves with the collective 
narratives. There are diversities in the sets of opinions and beliefs among both Israelis and 
Palestinians. These diversities might contribute to challenge the contemporary collective 
belief-systems that are coloring the public agenda. However, this paper will focus on the 
narratives that are broadly shared within each society. They can be regarded as dominant, 
and are repeatedly found in the public agenda featured on TV, radio, school- curriculums, 
and in newspapers (Bar-Tal et al. 2004). 
 
In the following, some of the central opposing historical narratives that exist within the 
Israeli and Palestinian societies will be presented.  
 
1) The foundational myth  
2) The war of 1948  
3) Right to return 
4) Israeli use of violence 
5) Palestinian use of violence 
6)   Narrating peace  
 
 
3.1. The foundational myth  
The historical connection to the territory is one of the main foundations of legitimacy for 
both groups, something that penetrate deep into the past (Bar-Tal et al. 2004). The Israeli 
foundational myth is based on the argumentation that the Jewish population has more than 
3000 years of history (Jawad 2006). The land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish 
people, and a land they were forcibly exiled from. As stated in the Torah, the Jewish people 
have been given the Promised Land through a contract with God, and are therefore fully 
entitled to this land (Reiter 2010). In the traditional Israeli perspective there are no 
Palestinians, only Arabs who lived in the British Mandate that later became Israel part of 
modern Israel. According to the narrative the land was almost completely emptied during 
the period of the Jewish Diaspora and was just (…)”  waiting  to  be  redeemed  by  the  Zionist  
modernizer” (Jawad 2006: 73). This  myth  of    ‘a  land  without  people’  is  dominant in much of 
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the Israeli history and their nation building. During the years with conflict this narrative has 
been widely spread in the state education in Israel. A study conducted on geography 
textbooks between 1882 and 1989 done by Yoram Bar-Gal can exemplify this (Bar-Tal et al. 
2004). Bar-Gal argues that the textbooks describe that Israeli care more about the country 
than the Arabs, and that they have made the desert into a flourishing land. The books also 
expresses that the Arabs neglect the same country and do not cultivate the land (Bar-Tal et 
al. 2004).  
  
Similar sets of justifications are being used on the Palestinian side. They consider 
themselves as the native people of the land, due to the fact that they have been living on 
this territory since the beginning of documented history (Kimmerling & Migdal 2003). They 
consider themselves as a nation distinctive from other Arab nations, a melting pot of 
different cultures, religions and tribes (Jawad 2006). The Palestinian identity has not, as 
often stated by the Israeli, been shaped as a reaction towards the Jewish national 
movement (Kimmerling & Migdal 2003). As Saleh Abdel Jawad is stating: ”(….) before the 
appearance of Zionist movement, a local national identity  was  in  process  of  formation”. 
(Jawad 2006: 74). The Jewish presence in this territory on the  other  hand  has  (…)  “only  been  
marginal  even  in  biblical  times  and  was  absent  for  2000  years” (Jawad 2006: 74). Jews are a 
religious group, and they are not a nation. They do not constitute a single nation with an 
identity of its own. Both groups have later revised this view, and to this day there is a sort of 
acceptance on both sides of the other’s national identity.   
 
3.2. The war of 1948 
Another dominant narrative within both the Israeli and Palestinian identities is the 
motivation and reason for the war of 1948 and its aftermath (Jawad 2006). In order to fully 
understand the Israeli narrative of the war of 1948, one must include the tragedy of the 
Holocaust. The Jewish history shows that they have been consistently subjects of what can 
be referred to as anti-Semitism (Jones 2011). They were uniquely stigmatized within the 
European social hierarchy, and through their long history they have suffered from 
persecution and prejudice in nearly every place they have lived (Jones 2011). The most 
tragic suffering of the Jewish people was the systematic genocide of millions of European 
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Jews by the Nazis during World War 2, later referred to as the Holocaust, meaning the 
Catastrophe (Jones 2011). This happened while the world remained apathetic, and it is 
reason to believe that this in combination with the collective traumas of the past can have 
contributed to the feeling of a siege mentality. The Holocaust made it clear that it was a 
need for a territorial solution for the Jewish people (Auerbach 2010). This together with 
other factors contributed to the UN resolution to partition of Palestine in 1947 (Pappe 
1994).  While the Zionist movement accepted the United Nations partition-plan, the Arab 
side rejected it and instantly went to war against it. A common belief within the Israeli 
society is that if this had not happened, the UN partitioning would still be in place and the 
Palestinians would have had their Palestinian state. Many Israelis consider the following 
War of Independence a defensive one where all surrounding Arabic nations were trying to 
destroy their new nation by attacking it (Bar-Tal & Salomon 2006). Against all odds the few 
Jews overcame the overwhelming power of the Arabic enemies, and finally after a long 
history of humiliation and discrimination, they secured the Jews their long wanted 
homeland (Caplan 1999). As a contrast to the Israeli War of Independence, the 1948 war 
stands out for the Palestinian people as al-Nakba, meaning the Catastrophe (Hammack 
2006). A common belief among Palestinians is that Holocaust was a catastrophic event, but 
it does not legitimize the right of the Jews to establish a state at the expense of the 
Palestinian people. In addition, it does not excuse the violence Israel is directing towards 
them. By creating a Jewish state within the heart of Palestine, the 1948 war was 
unavoidable because the Zionists were trying to build an exclusively Jewish state on the 
Palestinian. The years around 1948 were colored by severe violence and chaos. Zionist 
armies used terror and massacres to carry out the expulsion of Palestinians during the 1948 
war (Rouhana 2006). Thousands of Palestinians were killed, and around 750.000 inhabitants 
were forced to leave their towns and villages (Rouhana 2006). Palestinian homes, and in 
several cases entire villages, were demolished or taken over by the Israelis. Palestinians 
were forced to move to the surrounding Arab countries and in what is currently known as 
Gaza and the West Bank. According to (Jawad 2006) the 1948 war also had a direct impact 
on the capacity of Palestinians to write their own historical narrative. More than 400 
Palestinian population centers were destroyed, many of them represented the main cultural 
and intellectual centers of the Palestinian society (Jawad 2006). Several important libraries 
were demolished and major written heritages vanished. Al-Nakba therefore has a double 
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meaning: First, it represents the demolition of societies for most of the Palestinian 
population. Second, it represents the vanishing of urban centers, which again led to 
weakened the development of a Palestinian collective memory (Jawad 2006).  
 
3.3.  Right to return  
The Palestinian identity is highly connected to their experiences as refugees developed in 
the aftermath of 1948 (Caplan 1999). The Palestinians did now share a faith of disaster, 
which to a great extent separated them from the surrounding Arab countries. To this day 
Israeli laws still prevent Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and villages (Rouhana 
2006). Around 70 percent of Palestinians are refugees; there are nearly 4 million Palestinian 
refugees in the Middle East, and many more worldwide (Masalha 2003). For the Palestinians 
a resolution to the conflict cannot be accepted without addressing the refugees rights and 
needs (Masalha 2003).  A cornerstone of the Palestinian refugees struggle for acceptance is 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948 stating that “refugees wishing 
to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so 
at  the  earliest  practicable  date” (Masalha 2003: 70). Many of the refugees are living in 
refugee camps in surrounding Arab countries, and with the exception of Jordan they are not 
permitted to gain citizenships. Many still hold the keys to homes they were driven from, a 
key that together with the painful story is passed on from generation to generation. What 
also generates significant anger among many Palestinians is the Israeli Law of Return (Prior 
2001). This law allows Jews from all around the world to be accepted as citizens of Israel. 
These are people who have never lived in Israel, while the Palestinians are refused to return 
to their villages and homes. For Palestinians this is a clear evidence of the fact that Israel 
wants to eliminate Palestinians from the territory.   
 
Since 1948 the Israeli narrative towards the Palestinian refugees has been colored by denial 
(Rouhana 2006). The right of return is a privilege that is reserved for Jews returning from 
2000 years of exile, and not for the Palestinians. It is common among many of the Israelis to 
refuse to accept their responsibility for the refugees; instead they hold the view that it is 
rather the responsibility of the Arab countries. It is something the Arab nations have refused 
to acknowledge, with the exception of Jordan. According to the book of Simon Perez (1993) 
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the right of return for Palestinian refugees is an unacceptable claim. If accepted, it would 
wipe out the national character of the state of Israel, turning the Jewish majority into a 
minority (Masalha 2003).  Some compensation has been discussed, but neither the left nor 
right wings of political Israel accept the Palestinians right to return. If so, it should at least be 
within the context of a Jewish state.  
 
3.4. Israeli use of violence  
From the Palestinian point of view, Israel is a violent and militaristic regime- some even 
claims a terrorist state - that are stealing more and more of the little land that is left for the 
Palestinian people. The war of 1948 was only the first of several wars between Israel, 
Palestine, and the surrounding Arab countries. One of them was the Six Day War in 1967. It 
changed the map radically, leading to the Israeli occupation of Gaza, West Bank and East 
Jerusalem. From then and to this day the relationship between Israel and Palestine is based 
on a relationship between the occupier and the occupied. Israel has gained strategic control 
over major parts over the Palestinian territories, and for each day that goes by they are 
expanding the area with illegal settlements. According to B’tselem,  the  Israeli information 
Center for human rights in the OPT, did the numbers of settlers increase with 4, 9 percent in 
2010 (B'Tselem 2011). Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) completely controls Palestinian civilians 
with checkpoints and roadblocks. Security wall - by many Palestinians referred to as 
Apartheid wall- penetrate the Palestinian landscape (Ingdal & Simonsen 2005). This has a 
negative effect on the Palestinian daily life. Basic activities such as going to school or visiting 
family-members can involve great challenges, and often lead to humiliation and violence in 
confrontation with Israeli settlers or soldiers at the different check points (Ingdal & 
Simonsen 2005). Every Palestinian knows a family member whose home has been 
demolished or olive trees has been uprooted. Many Palestinians have a family member that 
has been killed, wounded, or died due to lack of medical care. The several decades with 
humiliation and fear have most certainly sharpened the Palestinian prejudice toward Israel, 
which again has led to deepening the conflict.  
 
Israel, on the other hand, claims that their use of military power is outmost necessary for 
their ability to survive. As the Jewish historian David Biale put it:  “Hatred  of  Jews  remains  a  
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problem unresolved. Instead of sovereignty turning the Jews into a nation like all others, the 
Jewish state becomes a new expression of the separation between the Jews and the rest of 
the world (...)”  (Caplan 1999: 70). Israel has developed narrative of ‘national security, which 
has been constructed around the representation  of  Israel  as  a  ‘nation  under  siege’  
surrounded by enemies that are threatening to throw the entire population into the sea 
(Sharoni 1994). The strongly settled security narrative is among other based on the memory 
of Holocaust, with a cry of never experiencing a Holocaust again (Caplan 1999). In addition is 
the narrative reinforced by the many wars that have been fought between Israel and the 
Arabic countries, as well as the Palestinian suicide and rackets attacks on Israeli civilians 
(Caplan 1999). The narrative often given in media and public sphere is that it is the 
Palestinians who start the violent acts, which forces them to defend themselves. The senior 
adviser to former Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon is quoted: “Israel is a democratic island 
in an ocean of Arabic tyranny, and we have the right to self-protection”  (Ingdal & Simonsen 
2005: 41). The narrative of national security is penetrating deep into every level of the 
society, and the IDF has become one of the most important institutions in the country (Givol 
et al. 2004). The military service is compulsory by law for both men (3 years) and women (2 
years) (Givol et al. 2004). The military is present in the Israeli educational system, starting 
already in the primary school, where children learn about important battles. In high schools 
the real preparation for the army-service starts, where combat soldiers are visiting classes 
and teach about the benefits of joining the combat-service (Givol et al. 2004). Military check 
points, and also the construction of to what Israel refers to as the separation wall is by the 
several hold claimed as only a reaction to terrorism (Ingdal & Simonsen 2005). However, 
Israeli presence in the OPT is something that causes division within the Israeli society. A 
common belief within the political left is that Zionism has done enough damage, and the 
illegal settlers must withdrawal from at least some parts of the West Bank (Bar-On 2006). 
Such an approach is unacceptable to many of the Israeli Right, and from this perspective 
building settlements is not referred to as an occupation (Bar-On 2006). The Promised Land 
by God consists of the whole area from the Mediterranean Sea in the West to the Jordanian 
River in the east. Many Jews therefore perceives it as their religious duty to build 
communities in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) (Bar-On 2006).  
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3.5.  Palestinian use of violence   
Suicide bombings and the rocket attacks by Palestinians on Israeli citizens are, according to 
Israel, one of the central causes of the contemporary conflict. The violent actions show how 
many Palestinians are terrorists with the aim of eliminate Jews from the territory (Bar-Tal et 
al. 2004). The general Israeli view is that Palestinians have no desire for peace (Bar-Tal & 
Salomon 2006). The slogan commonly used for Palestinians suicide  attacks  is  “I  seek  death  if  
Jews  die  with  me”  (Berko 2007). Destruction of the Jewish people is what they are aiming 
for, and no division is made between innocent and guilty, between children, women or men 
(Berko 2007). These attacks on innocent people are by the Israeli society perceived as 
immoral, and they have created a deep fear among the Israeli citizens of being killed on 
open streets (Ingdal & Simonsen 2005). Many Israelis have also lost friends and relatives as 
victims to the conflict. The Palestinians, on the other hand, are divided in the morality of the 
suicide bombings. In the light of hopelessness and despair, the suicide bombers are often 
referred to as freedom fighters; the only weapon left to fight for a homeland against the 
strong Israeli army (Berko 2007). Palestinians feel powerless to the daily humiliation and 
with their infrastructure being severely damaged and the economy torn to shreds, many 
Palestinians believe that there is nothing else left to do.   
 
3.6. Narrating peace 
A well-established narrative coloring the public agendas of both sides is that there is no one 
to talk to on the other side about the question of peace. As a consequence, there is little 
hope for any peace negotiation between the two sides. According to Bruece E. Wexler 
(2007) this narrative more or less belongs to the conservative groups of people in both 
societies, including the extremists. Wexler claims that the extremists are in minority 
compared to the moderates, but still they are dictating the political agenda and public 
thinking. Israelis with an extremist attitude usually belong to the radicalized right side of 
politics (Bland 2003). They are deeply religious, and include many of the Jewish settlers 
living on the West Bank. On the Palestinian side, people with an extremist attitude usually 
belong to the militant Islamic party Hamas (Bland 2003). The question about peace is to a 
high degree on minds of the extremists, even so, it is a peace that does not include both 
peoples. Their way of defining peace can be referred to as the Greater Israel and the 
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Greater Palestine, where both visions include a rejection of the other (Bland 2003). For the 
most part Israeli extremists picture a homeland that consists of Israel, the West Bank and 
Gaza. Only Jews are allowed to live in these areas. They are going to live there in peace and 
in an environment of non-violence, free from any anti-Semitic attacks (Bland 2003). 
Similarly, Palestinian extremist groups are fighting for a Palestinian state that goes all the 
way from Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea (Bland 2003). Only Palestinian people will 
live in this area, including those that had to escape during the wars of 1948 and 1967 (Bland 
2003).  
 
The moderates, on the other hand, endorse a peace plan that includes both people (Wexler 
2007). On the Israeli side many of them belong to the left side of politics. They are often 
moderate secular Jews, and are commonly referred to as ‘leftists’ (Kimmerling 2008). On the 
Palestinian side, the moderate Palestinians have more democratic aspirations than the 
militant Islamism represented by Hamas, and usually belong to the secular nationalist 
movement, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Kimmerling 2008). In opposite to the 
extremists’  narrative  of  peace  the moderates have a future vision that consists of both 
peoples living side by side in two separate states (Bland 2003). There are several variation of 
this idea, but the state of Palestine is most often based on the borders of 1967 with a swap 
of up to “4% equally valuable land to accommodate settlers and the security concerns” 
(Bland 2003: 8). Despite the fact that the moderates are in majority on both sides, it is still 
the peace plan of the extremists that “set  the  agenda  and  control  the  terms  of  discussion,  
thinking  and  relating”  (Wexler 2007: 337).  
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4.  Methodology  
 
This chapter will discuss the research strategy together with the various research methods 
that form the basis for this thesis. It will also give the reader insight into the process of the 
conducted fieldwork, together with challenges and limitations alongside it. In the end of the 
chapter I will outline some ethical considerations that is considered as relevant for the 
research.  
 
4.1.  A Qualitative Research Strategy      
The aim for this research is to investigate the perceived value and effect grassroots level 
dialogue groups have for its participants. The hope is to gain insight  into  the  participants’  
thoughts, opinions and reasons for their choices.  A qualitative research strategy is 
therefore considered to match the nature of this research in a best possible way. According 
to Brymann (2004) a qualitative research emphasizes words rather than quantifications and 
views the way in which individuals interpret their social world. It is a strategy that is well 
suited  if  the  researcher’s  goal  is  to  probe  beneath  the  surface  appearance. The data 
collection methods for a qualitative research are conducted in a natural setting (Bryman 
2004). Books and articles can only give limited information about insight in human relations, 
and about their deeper perceptions and thoughts. In order to understand how the social 
world is functioning, firsthand participation is therefore needed (Silverman 2006). The 
closeness to the people being investigated is considered as important in order to be able to 
see the world with their eyes. It was therefore clear from the beginning that a fieldwork had 
to be conducted for gaining insight in what personal significance the dialogue groups have 
for its members. Therefore the decision was made to go to Israel and Palestine for two 
months to provide empirical data with relation to the scope of the thesis. It felt important to 
engage in the natural setting of the participants by attending dialogue sessions, and by 
conducting interviews in settings comfortable to them.  
4.1.1.  Epistemological and ontological traditions  
A research strategy is not a purely neutral tool. According to Brymann (2004) it can be 
closely tied to the researcher’s view on how the social reality should be studied. The 
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researcher’s  considerations  around epistemology and ontology will among other have a 
great impact on a research. Therefore there is necessary to outline what philosophical 
traditions this thesis is influenced by.  
 
Epistemology: There is a division within academics about the question on what should be 
regarded as acceptable knowledge. Some academics claim that the social world should be 
studied according to the same principles as natural science, which is known as positivism 
(Bryman 2004). This thesis, however, is based on the contrasting epistemology termed 
interpretivism. This position emphasizes that research on the social world should not only 
be aware on simply quantifying what actually happens is social phenomena, but also 
provide an interpretation in terms of how the people involved understand their own 
experience (Bryman 2004). This can be connected to the research questions in the sense 
that I want to collect an in depth understanding in terms of how participants involved in 
dialogue perceive their participation. The interpretive perspective have most certain had an 
impact on how research questions are formulated, and on how fieldwork and the analysis of 
data have been conducted.  
 
Ontology: The next question concerns the ontological position to science, which for this 
research can be regarded as constructionist. Constructionism is a position that asserts social 
phenomena as something indeterminate instead of definitive (Bryman 2004). This thesis 
assumes that a society is not pre-given, but instead constituted through interaction by the 
people that live in it. On one hand societies are continuously subject to adjustments by their 
social actors. On the other hand people shape their perceptions of the world through 
among others what kind of society, religion or gender they are connected to. In other 
words, what an individual believes is truth depends to some degree on his self-image. This 
thesis assumes that Israelis and Palestinians perceive the truth about their own group, the 
other group as well as the conflict differently; all dependent on which side they belong to.  
 
4.2. Case-study design  
Research design can be defined as a framework for collecting and analyzing data (Bryman 
2004). This thesis is based on a case-study design. It is a commonly used design tool within 
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social sciences, especially when the researcher wants get an in-depth understanding of 
relatively small numbers of individuals, groups, or events (Patton 2002). It matches the aim 
of this research, which is to understand the complex issues and experiences around 
grassroots level dialogue. In this research the various participants connected to grassroots 
dialogue is the case, and the aim is to provide an in depth view of how they experience the 
encounters. By selecting dialogue encounters between a particular group of people - Israeli 
and Palestinian participants - I have chosen to look at grassroots dialogue limited to only 
one geographical area. It is therefore difficult to generalize empirical data from a case study 
in the sense that the findings are limited to the case itself. However, according to Patton 
(2002): “Cases (e.g. people, groups, organizations, communities, culture, events) are selected 
because  they  are  informational  rich  and  (…)  aimed  at  insight  about  the  phenomenon,  not  
empirical  generalization  from  a  sample  to  the  population” (Patton 2002: 40).  
 
The aim of this case-study is to look at several types of dialogue groups where each group 
represents different types and traditions. There were especially three diverse qualities that I 
wanted to embrace into this study. The first component concerns the representation of 
voices from both non-political as well as political groups. In addition there was a wish to 
include people that have been involved in a non-functional dialogue group. The last 
component was to have a balance between young and old participants, as well as men and 
women. This is due to the fact that they might view society as well as dialogue differently. 
The study ended up having five different dialogue groups. An in depth description of each 
group, and also the interviewed participants is presented in chapter 5.  
 
4.3. Entering the field  
The research-material for this thesis was gathered between October 20 and December 26. 
2009. From the very beginning the decision was made to only focus on dialogue groups 
between Israeli and Palestinians living on the West Bank, and not from the Gaza strip. This 
was due to practical reasons such as the consideration of the scope of the thesis. In addition 
it is also easier to access West Bank than the Gaza strip, due to the strict control-regime that 
one must go through in order to enter Gaza. Doing research on joint dialogue between 
Israeli and Palestinians means facing the contrasts between two very different worlds. 
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Geographically they are very close, but the way of living seems worlds apart. To be as 
neutral as possible the decision was made to live in East Jerusalem at Mount of Olives, and 
from this position travel between the West Bank and Israel. This is due to the fact that it 
gave me as much input as possible from both cultures rather than having a major influence 
from only one, which most probably would have been the case if I had either lived in Israel 
or West Bank. Instead of renting a car, I decided to use public transportation, or driving with 
members of different dialogue groups. This was due to the fact that good conversations 
could occur during the travel, such as fruitful discussions with random people on the bus/ 
taxi-drivers. It also gave me a chance to get to know the participants better when driving 
with them.  
4.3.1. Using snowball method as sampling method 
Entry into the field started several months before the fieldwork was conducted. Sending an 
amount of emails and taking several phone calls to different groups ended with no 
response. It was only after arriving in Jerusalem that I started to receive positive responses. 
Due to the difficulty of getting in contact with dialogue groups the solution fell on using a 
snowball sampling method. This is a technique where existing study subjects recruit future 
subjects from among their acquaintances (Bryman 2004). By establishing contact with one 
subject you get help with generating leads for additional subjects. The challenge with this 
sampling method might be that the sample often recruits people from same group and with 
one specific type of qualification. Having focus on involving participants from different 
dialogue groups based on different strategies hopefully helped reducing this risk. At the 
same time this thesis is based on a qualitative research approach where there is less weight 
on having samples of representatives that are valid for the whole population. 
 
It turned out that the dialogue groups are to a great degree interlinked in Israel and 
Palestine. After first getting a foothold inside the dialogue network, it was easy to make 
contact with people that were willing to be interviewed. During interviews, and during 
attendances in dialogue meetings, there were often people who knew of people in other 
dialogue groups, whom I could contact, or other dialogue events that I could attend. After 
being involved in this dialogue network for some time good contacts were established, and I 
often got contacted if something was happening.  
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4.4. Research Methods   
There are several research methods for gathering data in a qualitative research, where the 
most commonly used are participant observations, qualitative interviews, focus groups, 
discourse and conversations analysis and analysis of texts and documents (Bryman 2004). 
The major emphasis for this research is on qualitative interviews of participants that are 
part of different dialogue groups. However, the aim is to support the interviews by 
observing/being involved in as many dialogue meetings as possible. Using several methods 
is regarded as common in qualitative research, and something that is often encouraged to 
do (Bailey 2007). This is due to the fact that the different methods can complement each 
other. On one hand can an observed behavior be clarified in an interview, while on the 
other hand can the spoken word be better understood through observation. 
 
4.4.1. Semi-structured Interviews 
A qualitative interview can be defined as a conversation with a specific structure and 
purpose (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). This is a preferable data collection method if the 
researcher seeks greater understanding of how people perceive their world, and also to the 
different meanings they attach to it. Face to face interaction with respondents provides a 
unique opportunity to penetrate deeply into the topics and explore the complexity and 
richness  of  the  participants’  values,  experiences  and  challenges  (Bryman 2004). Qualitative 
interviews were therefore a natural choice of method. There exist several forms of 
interviews, such as unstructured, structured and semi-structured interviews (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009). This thesis is based on the latter ones. What characterizes a semi-
structured interview is the flexibility of it. The major topics and questions are more or less 
defined in advanced; however the order of raising them differs from interview to interview 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  
 
From the beginning the decision was made to only interview people that spoke English. This 
is due to the fact that using a translator for long conversations with several sensitive 
questions could become a challenge. There was a risk that having a third person translating 
could damage the confidence between the participant and the researcher, and limit and/or 
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change the information given. The wish and purpose of the interviews was to make the 
setting relaxed, and try to have as flowing conversation as possible. It is reason to believe 
that it might be easier to achieve this with a direct conversation was in a language I know. 
The  interviews  were  held  either  at  the  participant’s  home,  or  at  a  café  suggested  by  the  
participants. This was done in an attempt to make the participants more comfortable with 
the situation, and hopefully making the relationship between the participants and the 
researcher less unequal. If the conversation found place at a café, the participants were 
asked in advance to reflect upon the consequences of having other people around. Almost 
all of the home-visits included a meal with the participants and his/her family. These home-
visits were more time demanding, but also more preferable. It enabled me to get to know 
the participants better, and often other relevant topics were raised during the meal. It was 
also interesting to ask other family members about their opinions, values and interests 
around dialogue, and whether they supported it or not.   
 
4.4.1.1. Interview guide  
Before each interview an interview guide was prepared and specifically adjusted to each of 
the settings. The guideline was taken in use during the meetings to make sure that the main 
subjects were discussed. The following only illustrates a rough outline of the topics:  
 
1) Motivations for joining dialogue group 
2) How long have they been involved? 
3) Has the participation changed his/her view about the conflict? 
4) Has the participation changed his/her view about the other (Israeli/Palestinians)?  
5) If he/she believes grassroots dialogue can change/end the conflict?  
6) What other factors must be taken into consideration in order to end the conflict 
7) Challenges about dialogue  
8) Does he/she still believe in dialogue, or has the optimism waned after being 
involved? (Is the optimism strengthened?)  
9) Reactions from family/ friends 
10) Participants’  reflections around the structure of this specific dialogue group.  
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Short-term vs. long-term/ Politically vs. non-politically/ Women group vs. mixed 
groups/ Programs conducted abroad vs. groups conducted inside the conflicting 
area.  
 
 
The order of the questions varied from each interview. I tried actively to listen to what the 
participants were saying, and additional questions were often asked during the interviews. 
There was given space for the participants to talk about other topics that were important to 
them. It was important that the participants were involved in shaping the interviews, and 
deciding how deep they wanted to go into each of the topics. The interviews lasted between 
one to three hours. The reason for this time difference was that home visits were more time 
demanding than the ones that were conducted at cafés. Some were also more talkative 
than others, and the time available also differed from person to person. After each 
interview the conversation was briefly reflected upon. New themes and questions 
sometimes occurred, which was added to the interview guide before the next interview 
session.  
 
According to Bryman (2004) it is preferable to use a tape recorder when conducting 
interviews. All of the participants were asked and they gave their consents to use the 
recorder. Therefore the device was taken in use for all of the interviews, except one, where 
the recorder did not work. For this interview key words were written down during the 
conversation, and a detailed text was produced as accurate as possible the same evening. It 
is  acknowledged  that  a  tape  recorder  may  influence  the  participants’  answers.  Bryman  is  
arguing: “the  use  of a tape recorder might disconcert respondents, who become self 
conscious  or  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  their  words  being  preserved” (Bryman 2004: 330). 
However, it seemed like the tape recorder had little effect on how freely they were speaking 
compared to before and after the recorder was turned on. There are many advantages to 
using a recorder. One of them is that it gives the researcher the possibility to pay full 
attention to what is being said, rather than using time on writing down sentences (Bryman 
2004). The researcher can then rather focus on following up what is being said with 
additional questions. Having recorded the interviews was also helpful in the sense that one 
could go back listening to the interviews when writing up the findings. It also helped clearing 
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up some misunderstandings. All of the interviews were transcribed. The quotes from 
transcriptions that are used in this thesis have in some occasions been marginally adjusted 
in order to clarify the structure of the sentences.  
 
4.4.2. Attendance and Observations 
The interviews were supported by as much attendance in different dialogue meetings as 
possible. This is due to the fact that one  can  observe  participants’  internal  relationship  and  
actions in it’s natural environment (Thagaard 2006). I wanted to observe the relationships 
between the participants, especially the dynamic that took place between Israeli and 
Palestinian participants. There are many aspects of observation as a tool of data collection 
in social research. One of the distinctions “concerns  the  extent  to  which  the  observer  will  be  
a  participant  in  the  setting  being  studied”  (Patton 2002: 265).  There exists two apexes in 
observations, where one is to be completely immersed in the actions in the field, and the 
other is to be completely separated from the activities. I wanted to move somewhere in 
between the two choices, which is referred to as being participant observer. Being a 
participant observer means that the researcher participates in the ongoing activities, but at 
the same time “  members  of  the  social  setting  are  aware  of  the  researcher’s  status  as  a  
researcher” (Bryman 2004: 301). I engaged to some extent during the meetings, and 
mingled with the participants during meals and during coffee brakes. It was an excellent 
opportunity to get to know more people. I was then able to conduct informal conversations 
among others around the scope of the research, and it also made me able to schedule new 
interviews. On the other hand I tried always to be aware of my role as a researcher.  
 
Patton (2002) argues that observational data must include points such as the setting, the 
activities, the people who participated and the meaning behind the activities. These points 
were always in my consciousness when joining the dialogue meetings. Quick thoughts, 
questions and observations were written down in a notebook during meetings. Afterwards 
the notes were as fast as possible reviewed and a more detailed text about the experiences 
was formulated. Every evening I also wrote down thoughts and experiences that had 
happened during the day. This diary was separated from the observations notes that were 
taken during the dialogue meetings and the interviews.  
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During the fieldwork period, I aimed to take part in activities in three out of five dialogue 
groups. The two other groups were impossible to reach, due to the fact that one of them no 
longer exists, and the other one is a summer camp conducted in Germany. The more 
detailed description of the participation is outlined in chapter 5. In addition I took part in 
several others activities that were perceived as relevant for the thesis. One of the activities 
was a whole day with joint olive harvest in a Palestinian village on the OPT. During olive 
season an Israeli peace movement gives Palestinian farmers a hand with their harvest, and 
protect them as best they can against the Israeli soldiers. I had the opportunity to join one 
of the tours, and the bus trip together with the hours spent on the field opened up for long 
conversations with both Israeli and Palestinians around the political situation as well as the 
topic of my research. In addition I also worked as a volunteer for the Ecumenical 
Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), where I was used as a substitute 
while the people working in one of the placements were on a course. I spent three days in 
Yanoun, a Palestinian village placed in the north of the West Bank. I also divided my days as 
equal as possible between time spent in Israeli cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv, and time 
spent at the West Bank, such as Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Nablus. I took many bus rides 
both in Israel and in the West Bank, and passed through many checkpoints and Israeli 
security checks. This I believe gave me a more in-depth knowledge on the meaning of the 
military occupation for both Israeli and Palestinian communities, and an overall 
understanding of the situation for the Israeli Palestinian dialogue groups.  
 
4.5. Data Analysis  
There  are  several  ways  of  analyzing  participants’  accounts  about  their  perceptions  and  
experiences. This can among others be done through the use of narrative analysis, grounded 
theory, or a qualitative thematic analysis (Bryman 2004). This research is based on the latter 
analysis approach; however it might consist of elements that are similar to the other 
analysis methods that are mentioned above. Thematic analysis is a method that searches 
across a data set, such as across a numbers of interviews, in order to identify repeated 
patterns, themes, concepts and meanings (Braun & Clarke 2006). According to Bailey (2007) 
the analysis process is something that must happen simultaneously with the data collection, 
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and not only after the fieldwork is finished. During the fieldwork I was therefore aware of 
how the received information could be interpreted, and on how/if narratives were 
answering research questions. These reflections have been written in the field notes and 
were useful in later stages of the analysis process. I also started to look for meanings 
through listening to the recorded conversations as quickly as possible. This was often done 
on the bus trip back home. It enabled me to discover new and important issues that were 
not yet considered, which could be asked in the future interviews.  
4.5.1. Transcribing  
In a thematic analysis it is necessary that the researcher is familiar with the data in order for 
the analysis to be as insightful as possible (Braun & Clarke 2006). Therefore, after leaving 
the field, the decision was made on transcribing all interviews into written text. The process 
was time demanding, due to the fact that everything was written word by word. However, 
listening to the conversations over again was useful in the sense that I experienced the 
feelings and the mood that developed during the different interviews one more time. This 
time the focus was only directed in listening, instead of using energy in preparing additional 
questions. To experience the interviews over again helped me look at them in new ways, 
and hence made me able to discover new patterns and bigger lines. I believe that I during 
this process developed a more in-depth understanding of the data.  
 
4.5.2. Coding  
After transcribing the interviews, the texts were printed out and re-read one more time. 
They were coded manually by highlighting aspects in the data that had a potential to form 
basis of repeated patterns. The coding was done with different colored pens, one color 
dedicated for each pattern. I coded for as many potential themes as possible, where some 
became a pattern while other did not. The different colored themes were then enumerated 
in a document. Taking advice from Braun and Clarke (2006). I included relevant surrounding 
data, in order to not lose the context it was taken from. In each theme I included relevant 
quotes from different participants that captured its essence. Throughout the process I 
wrote down where the different quotes were taken from, so I easily could locate back to 
them. I continuously compared what was being said during interviews with the field notes 
taken from the participants’  observation.  After  gaining  deep insight into the material I 
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started to sum it up into one document. I began with the aspects that had captured my 
attention the most, and worked systematically through the whole material. This gave me a 
foundation to compare and to withdraw experiences and perceptions that were similar to 
one another, and also experiences and perceptions that differed from one another. In the 
discussion I have with purpose choose to include a great amount of quotes from the 
research interviews that capture the essence of the point that I am trying to demonstrate. 
While doing this I have in some occasions corrected basic spelling mistakes in order to 
increase the readability of the quotations. This process led to the result of seven different 
themes and a various numbers of sub-themes, which is outlined and discussed in chapters 6 
and 7.   
 
4.5.3. The relation between primary and secondary data  
According to Braun and Clarke (2006) one can in a thematic analysis choose to code in 
several different ways, all depends on whether the themes are going to be data driven 
(inductive) or theory driven (deductive). In this research, themes and patterns have derived 
from both fields, as the gathering of theory and data have been a continuous and parallel 
process. The topic of the thesis has been of interest for a long period of time, and I have 
therefore entered the fieldwork, and later the analysis process, with a theoretical 
foundation gained from various range of literature. There were some specific questions 
based on this theoretical foundation that I wanted to find out during the analyzing of the 
data. At the same time I was trying to be open for other patterns of interests that was not 
connected to the research questions. During the interviews I was, as already mentioned, 
letting the participants guide the interview in directions felt important for them, and new 
themes often occurred during that process. There has been a constant comparison between 
the empirical data and relevant theories in the sense that new themes and hence more 
theories are added after the analysis began in order to give more background to the 
findings. It also gave me deeper insight into aspects raised by the participants that in 
advanced was new to me, and after studying it through theory became more 
understandable and also meaningful to the thesis. One example might be the word 
‘normalization’,  a  concept  raised  by  almost  all  of  the  participants.  The  concept  was  new  and  
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in the beginning hard to grasp, and it ended up being very meaningful and have great 
importance for the research.  
 
4.6.  Challenges and limitations to qualitative research   
Whenever doing a research one might face several challenges on the way. It can concern 
the quality and the trustworthiness of research, but it can also concern some practical 
challenges. This research faced them both, which in the following will be outlined.  
 
4.6.1. The  researcher’s  impact  on  the  interview  setting     
In a qualitative research effort the most common tool for gaining data is the researcher 
him/herself. This might cause several implications. One major criticism is that the 
researcher’s  presence  may  affect  how  the  participants  behave  and  respond.  According  to  
Ervin Goffman (1971) an interview setting can be compared with a theatrical performance, 
where the actors –in this case the participants- adjust their expressions to the audience 
listening, which in this case is the researcher. People might easily be affected by what they 
believe the audience wants to hear, in order to be perceived in a good light. Therefore one 
might believe that some values and opinions easily can be over-communicated, while others 
again are under-communicated. During the interview such performances have most 
probably taken place, however this is difficult to find out unless the researcher spends 
enough  time  with  the  participants  in  order  to  get  access  “backstage“  (Goffman 1971). The 
timeframe for this fieldwork was limited. However, despite the time shortage I made an 
effort to meet the participants that were interviewed several times and in different social 
contexts. The majority of the people that were interviewed I managed to meet both in a 
dialogue setting as well as in the individual interview setting. For some of the people that I 
interviewed I also had the opportunity to spend time with them at home together with their 
family. Meeting the participants in different settings might have increased the chances of 
getting familiar with the more informal sides of the participants as well. In addition to this I 
always tried to create as comfortable an atmosphere during the interviews as possible. As 
already outlined I let the participants decide where to meet, and made an effort of being as 
humble and genuinely interested in each of the participants unique stories. Sensitive 
questions were being raised, and for some of the participants this was emotionally difficult 
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to talk about. I consciously avoided expressing my personal views, in order not to influence 
what kinds of experiences and opinions the interviewees felt comfortable expressing.  
 
Another  aspect  that  must  be  taken  into  considerations  is  the  researcher’s  gender,  age  and  
culturally belonging, which also might have an impact on the interview setting (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009). My status as a young woman from Scandinavia may to some degree have 
colored the interview situation. This was especially apparent in some of the interviews that 
were conducted with the Israeli participants, which repeatedly had a need to defend 
themselves and give explanations for why Israel is acting the way they are doing. They are 
most probably used to face criticism from international solidarity groups, which as a young 
woman from Norway they might have felt that I was representing, and therefore wanted to 
over communicate the message that Israel is not an evil country. All interaction also takes 
place in a gendered context. Studies have shown that participants sometimes provide 
different information dependent on whether the researcher is of the same or opposite sex 
(Silverman 2000). Due to this I tried my best to recruit a gender-balanced group of 
participants for this research study. However, I did not feel that the interviews that were 
conducted with male participants differed from the ones that were conducted with the 
females. All participants, despite their gender, were communicative and willing to provide 
answers to all the questions that were given.  
4.6.2. Objectivity 
Another major criticism to qualitative research is the subjective character of the collected 
data, which can challenge the reliability of the study. Reliability can be understood with the 
study’s  ability  to  be  reproduced  if  conducted  by  another  researcher at a different time 
(Bryman 2004). For this to be possible the findings should not be biased and influenced by 
the opinions, feelings and personality of the researcher. However, the question is whether 
complete objectivity is feasible and wanted in a qualitative study based on fieldwork. This 
specific research was not aiming to generate an objective truth, but rather to extract the 
participant’s  reflections  and  perceptions around dialogue encounters. According to Bailey 
(2007: 184) “recognizing  the  subjective  nature  of  field  research,  they  replace  objectivity  and  
value  neutrality  with  conformability,  which  requires  that  findings  be  supported  by  data”. In 
order to make others able to confirm the produced results I have made sure that the 
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findings  are  supported  by  the  data.  I  have  also  to  a  great  extent  used  participants’  own  
words when coding the data as an effort to maintain their voices in the analysis.   
 
In addition I have made a great effort in being aware of, and keeping a critical distance to 
own personal bias. A common phenomenon for all people is that they use previous 
experiences to make sense of new ones, and therefore it is impossible for a researcher to be 
totally neutral when listening to participants. Most certainly I have developed a personal 
and political bias to the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, not at least during a three months 
stay at the West Bank on behalf of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine 
and Israel (EAPPI) in 2007. It gave me an insight into the great difficulties the Palestinian 
people are exposed to as a consequence of the Israeli military occupation. While living in a 
Palestinian village, and spending many hours at military checkpoints also gave me the 
opportunity to listen to a great number of Palestinian people, and hence their stereotypes, 
narratives and judgments to the conflict. This has most certainly given me a personal 
attachment to the conflict, and a genuine empathy with the Palestinian people. Therefore it 
was necessary to reflect upon my personal and political bias to the conflict, before, during, 
and also after the fieldwork was conducted, in order to limit the impact the bias could have 
on the data. During the fieldwork I was conscious about being as open minded and curious 
as possible to all people on both side of the conflict. I believe that by encouraging the 
participants to explain their reflections and showing interest in their unique experiences 
they have been able to bring up topics that they perceived as important. I tried my very best 
to respect and be as humble as possible to the multiple truths revealed to me during the 
interviews and through participant observation, regardless of whether it was similar with 
my own views. I also put a great effort in spending a lot of time in Israel, meeting as many 
Israeli people as possible, which I believe gave me a more balanced view of the conflict. I 
was therefore able to experience how the conflict is affecting –if so in a very different way- 
the Israeli people as well, and experienced how the people on that side of the conflict also 
are emotionally suffering and do live under stressful circumstances.  
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4.6.3. Language barriers  
In addition there is a practical challenge that might have limited the research, which is the 
challenge concerning language barrier. As already outlined, the collections of people were 
limited to those who in addition to their mother tongue speak fluent English. This was due 
to the fact that using an interpreter for such time demanding and sensitive interviews might 
lead to errors, misunderstandings and also many ethical dilemmas. This automatically made 
a limitation on what type of people that I could interview. Especially elderly Palestinian 
women that speak fluent English were challenging to find, and I was only able to gather one 
for this research. In addition, several of the dialogue meetings were only conducted in 
Arabic and Hebrew, and not translated into English. For these sessions I therefore needed a 
participant to translate what was being said. Several points of relevance may then have 
been lost in translation.  
 
4.6.4. Generalization of the research  
A research is considered to have a high degree of generalization if the findings can be 
transferred to an external context (Bryman 2004). The aim for this specific research was not 
to develop empirical generalized information that can be transferred to a wider population, 
but to rather get an in-depth understanding of the lives of a limited number of participants. 
However, while the experiences and opinions expressed by the participants are unique for 
them and their situation, one might say that the findings may be applicable to similar places 
where dialogue is used as a method to reconciliation in an ongoing intractable conflict.  
 
 
4.7. Ethical considerations  
Ethical considerations are important in all stages of a research process, from the planning 
phase and all the way to the publishing of the thesis. Bryman (2004) argues that there are 
particularly three ethical areas that the researcher must have in mind when conducting a 
research. One of them is Informal Consent, which stresses the importance of giving 
participants as detailed information about the project as possible. The participants were 
informed about the aim and purpose of the research study, as well as how the information 
given was going to be used. Positive as well as negative effects of attaining the study were 
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outlined, and they were given a chance to withdraw from the research at any time during 
the interview, or before it was used in the research. In the end of each interview it was 
made room for participants to raise questions, which also gave them an opportunity to ask 
me about implications of the research. The second area concerns Confidentiality. Names 
and location related to participants was kept anonymous, and the audio files as well as the 
transcribed interviews were kept on a private computer. I also made sure that the 
information that was written in the field notes could not be traced back to the participants 
that were involved. The participants were well informed that their identity would be 
protected, among others that I would not use their names in the written records of my 
research.  Some of the interviewed Palestinian participants made it very clear that this was 
something they perceived as important, referring to the implications it might cause due to 
issues concerning normalization. However, the majority of the participants were relaxed 
about the area of confidentiality, due to the fact that they are trying to be as visible as 
possible in media with their specific message concerning the importance of using dialogue 
as a tool for reconciliation. The last point concerns the Consequences. The author must 
reflect over the benefits and the consequences the research might have for the participants. 
The research must not be followed through if there are reasons to believe that the negative 
consequences are greater than the benefits for the participants involved. What I found 
challenging was that the participants gave their valuable time and energy to provide me 
with data, while I did not have the opportunity to give much back to the people interviewed. 
Through use of semi-structured interviews it is a potentiality for the evolvement of in depth 
conversations, were participants share sensitive and personal information, which might 
contribute to the feeling of being used at the end of an interview (Kvale & Brinkmann 2008). 
This was something that I had in mind when conducting the interviews. They were clearly 
informed that they did not have to answer all the questions if they did not feel like it. I also 
tried my very best to let the participants feel that they were actively listened to, and that 
they had the opportunity to raise issues felt important to them. By letting them speak 
freely, several of the participants expressed that they discovered new insights and 
perspectives that they never had considered before. Few of the participants also expressed 
that they found it therapeutically valuable to talk about the traumatic experiences in life, 
such as loosing someone closely related.  
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5. Overview of dialogue groups and participants  
 
The focus of this thesis is on dialogue encounters that are conducted between Jewish and 
secular Israeli citizens on the one side, and Muslim and Christian Palestinians from the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories OPT (West Bank and East Jerusalem) on the other. The first 
part of this chapter will give a presentation of the five dialogue groups that are chosen for 
this research, with main focus on their contents and goals. Major part of the gained 
information is based on what has been revealed by the Interviewed participants during the 
interviews. This is supplemented with information found on the Internet. The second part of 
the chapter will give a general presentation of the 24 interviewed participants in relations to 
age, gender, geographical location, as well as religious and political background.  
 
5.1. Overview of the different dialogue groups  
 
Name of group Short name Comment 
Parents Circle Family Forum PCFF A group of bereaved Israeli and Palestinian 
families  
Breaking Barriers BB Two weeks workshop that is conducted in 
Germany, between Israeli and Palestinian 
youths  
Interfaith Encounter 
Association 
IEA Long-term religious dialogue between Israeli 
settlers and Palestinians living next to the 
settlement 
Minds of peace experiment MOPE Political short-term workshop, which lasted 
for two days 
Failed Dialogue Group FD Women’s  group  that  was  active  between  
1988 until 2000.  
Table 1: Overview of dialogue groups 
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5.1.1. Parents Circle - Family Forum (PCFF)  
The Parents Circle Bereaved Families Forum (PCFF) is a Palestinian-Israeli organization for 
people that have lost immediate family members due to the violence in the region. Yihak 
Frankenwall and Roni Hirschenson were the founders of the group in 1995 (PCFF 2012). 
Today it consists of more than 500 bereaved families, evenly split between the two sides of 
the conflict. People belonging to the group believe that they are all human beings, and 
despite their religious and culturally differences they are all bearing the same pain that 
comes after loosing a family- member. Members of PCFF have chosen to convert the 
feelings of anger and despair, into energies of hope and action, with the belief that 
reconciliation is the solution of the problem, and not revenge (PCFF 2012). Therefore there 
is reason to assume that their basis can be related to the human-relation approach. 
Members refer to their organization as non-political; instead of addressing political issues 
they attempt to show the human side of the story. They believe that the reconciliation 
process must be established by the people and for the people, apart from any political and 
national process (PCFF 2012). On the other hand, PCFF can be regarded as political, in the 
sense that their aim is to put substantial pressure on the leaderships in the region, in order 
to reestablish the peace process. The forum meets approximately once a month. They hold 
activities for the members within the forum, but are at the same time doing a lot of work for 
reaching people outside the group in both communities. This is done through lectures in 
high schools, media, art exhibitions, and through dialogue with all kinds of groups willing to 
listen. In  2006  the  Forum  established  a  pure  Women’s  group  (PCFF 2012). This happened as 
a reaction to the fact that it was challenging to make the Palestinian women visible in the 
PCFF, and having their voices heard. This was due to the fact that they often were sat to 
take care of their children, while the men represented the family. In 2009 the PCFF 
Women’s  group  arranged  an  event  called  “Neighbors-Bereaved Women creating 
reconciliation”.  It  consisted  of  a  two-day event held at the Tel Aviv Cinematheque in 
December. The event held sessions where Israelis were able to listen to Palestinians’  
personal narratives. In addition they arranged a sale fair where handcrafts prepared by the 
Palestinians and Israeli group-members could be bought. Many months of meeting and 
preparations between the Palestinian and Israeli women were behind this event. 
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As part of the fieldwork for the thesis I was able to observe several of these planning 
meetings prior the exhibition. I also attended the two days exhibition in Tel Aviv. Six 
participants were interviewed from PCFF, three Israeli and three Palestinians. Five of them 
were  women  from  the  PCFF’s  Women’s  group,  due  to  the  fact  that  this  was  the  group  I  used  
most time with.  
 
5.1.2. Breaking Barriers (BB) 
The Breaking Barriers initiative was founded in 2002. It consists of a two-week summer 
camp for young Israeli and Palestinians between the ages of 18 to 32. It is conducted 
abroad, in Germany. The general belief is that the circle of violence can be stopped through 
building mutual interests, solidarity and trust between individuals of the two societies. 
Inspired by the conflict-resolution tradition the discussions touch directly on the core issues 
of the conflict. They believe that the meeting will not fit the emotions of the participants, 
and hence it will not be honest if avoiding or bypassing the conflicting issues. If friendships 
are created during the two weeks it is good, but that is not their main goal. However, 
inspired by the human-relations approach, they want the young people to meet on an 
interpersonal level and not be representing any groups or movements. One aim of the 
program is that the participants will organize themselves and continue meeting and working 
for peace in their region after the camp ends. Each summer two seminar-groups are 
conducted. One is for men and women and the other is for women only. Each seminar 
group consists of three smaller groups. Each group consists of 20 participants evenly split 
between Israeli and Palestinians. In addition there is one facilitator from each side of the 
conflict. During the two weeks they live, eat, and have sessions together. The seminar has a 
strict structure containing three main parts. The first part lasts for three days and has a 
framework of activities related to the personal level, such as ice breaking activities. The 
second part takes place over the next three days and deals with the collective identity and 
historical narrative of Palestine and Israel. In the third part the different aspects and issues 
related to the conflict are discussed.  
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Altogether six people were interviewed from the BB initiative, evenly divided between 
Israeli and Palestinians. Two of the participants interviewed were facilitators, one Israeli and 
one Palestinian. All six of them were young women.   
 
 
5.1.3. Interfaith Encounter Association (IEA) 
The interfaith Encounter Association is a combination of Jews, Muslims, Christians and 
Druze, and is an umbrella association that arranges small meetings around the region based 
on conversations around religious traditions (IEA 2012). One such meeting is the interfaith 
dialogue that finds place between Palestinians from a village on the West Bank, and Israeli 
Jews living in the neighboring Israeli settlement. In 2009 they had ten members. The group 
is referred to as a non-political initiative. They avoid political discussions, which they believe 
will make it easier for all sorts of people to join. As similar to the human- relation approach 
they believe that the roots of prejudice lay in the absence of normalized inter-group 
contact. The group is attempting to find a common ground through cross-cultural study on 
common themes in Islam and Judaism. They believe that religion should be the source of 
the solution of the conflict, rather than being a cause of the problem, due to the fact that 
they have a lot in common. They meet approximately once a month, every second time in 
the Palestinian village and every second time in the Israeli Settlement. The meetings are 
conducted at their homes, and they always end the sessions by eating a meal together. For 
each session they have chosen a topic to discuss related to religion. A member from each 
group has prepared a speech, and after the speech they have an open discussion where 
everybody can ask questions and raise their meanings.  
 
As part of the field work I had the privilege to attain two sessions; one in the Palestinian 
village and the other in the Israeli settlement. In addition one of the Israeli members invited 
me to join of their family dinners, which I thankfully accepted. I was able to interview three 
people from this group, two Israeli women and one Palestinian man.  
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5.1.4. Minds of Peace Experiment (MOPE) 
MOPE is a series of exercises in peace making and conflict resolution. As stated on their 
homepage their ultimate goal is to: “create  the  social  conditions  for  peace  in  the  Palestinian-
Israeli  conflict  by  grassroots  effort  to  involve  the  public  in  the  peacemaking  “ (MOPE 2012). 
The group finds its basis in the conflict-resolution tradition, conducting political workshops 
for ordinary Israeli and Palestinian people. It is a simulation game, where unofficial 
representatives, such as teachers and hairdressers replace the politicians. MOPE is meant to 
provoke a public debate over central conflicting issues, and the aim is that throughout the 
workshop they will reach some imaginable solutions. It can be regarded as a preparation for 
a real official Palestinian-Israeli public assembly. Participants were relating to each other via 
their group membership, which is colored by the intergroup interaction model.  
 
November 20-21, 2009 a two-day program of MOPE was conducted in Beit Jalla, Bethlehem, 
at Mount Everest Hotel. It consisted of a delegation of six Palestinian and five Israeli 
participants that unofficially represented the two people. One Israeli and one Palestinian 
facilitated the talk. In addition there were an audience of approximately 20 Palestinians, 
Israeli and internationals listening to what was being said around the table. Each day 
consisted of five sessions, each lasting for two hours. Throughout the closing minutes of 
each session they opened up for question from the audience. The two delegations discussed 
the following issues:  
- Border and security 
- Jerusalem 
- Refugees 
 
During the two days almost all of the participants and audience shared meals together, and 
some also stayed the night at the hotel. This opened up for informal conversations that 
didn’t  always  include  political  issues.     
 
As part of my fieldwork I attended the two-days workshop as an audience, and did also 
spend the night at the Mount Everest Hotel. I shared a room with one of the Palestinian 
woman that sat in the panel. During the workshop weekend I had the opportunity to get to 
know the eleven people in the delegation. Five of them, three Palestinians men, one Israeli 
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woman, and one Israeli man were willing to later be interviewed. Additionally I had the 
opportunity to interview the Israeli facilitator and the creator of the workshop, and one 
Israeli man from the audience.  
 
 
5.1.5.   The  “failed”  dialogue group (FD)  
In addition to the four dialogue encounters mentioned above, an Israeli and a Palestinian 
from  a  previous  women’s  group  were  interviewed.  It  is  a  group  that  no  longer  exists.  This  
dialogue initiative started in 1988 and lasted for 12 years. The group broke down, due to the 
difficulties that followed by the second Intifada. They met approximately every second week 
and the meetings were held both at the Palestinian and Israeli homes. It was a core group 
that went on for twelve years, and a lot of other women that came and left during the 
period of time. The group was mainly influenced by both the human-relation tradition. They 
believed that the hatred and prejudice between the groups existed as a result of the lack of 
knowledge of one another. If only enough people from both sides could meet, and realize 
that  “the  other”  side  consists  of  human  beings  just  like  ourselves,  peace  would  eventually  
come. It was a loose structure over the meetings containing no professional facilitators, and 
all issues concerning both peoples were discussed. This included to great extent political 
issues. During the twelve years of existence deep personal friendship evolved between 
several members. Some of the Palestinian and Israeli women still meet, and they 
occasionally  call  each  other.  There  were  several  factors  that  contributed  to  the  group’s  
breakdown, among others were the physical difficulties in meeting after the Intifada. 
Another factor mentioned by the Palestinian woman was the emotional difficulties that 
occurred with the Intifada. The Palestinian felt humiliated, which made it impossible for 
them to continue the meetings. Several of the Palestinian participants also felt betrayed by 
the  Israeli  women,  in  the  sense  that  they  didn’t  support  them  enough  during  the second 
Intifada.  
 
Due to the fact that this group no longer exist it was difficult to recruit participants for in 
depth interviews. However, I managed to get in contact with two of the women, one 
Palestinian and one Israeli.  
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5.2.  The participants 
The following table 2 is an illustration of interviewed participants in terms of their 
connection to the different dialogue groups. Names have been changed and age is excluded 
in  order  to  protect  the  interviewees’  confidentiality.   
 
Interview Pseudonym Belonging Sex Dialogue group 
1 Kefaya Palestinian Female PCFF 
2 Ali Palestinian Male PCFF 
3 Sara Palestinian Female PCFF 
4 Hannah Israeli Female PCFF 
5 Miriam Israeli Female PCFF 
6 Elisheba Israeli Female PCFF 
7 Mona Palestinian Female BB 
8 Zeina Palestinian Female BB 
9 Hadas Isareli Female BB 
10 Maria Isareli Female BB 
11 Rachel (Facilitator) Israeli Female BB 
12 Noor    (Facilitator) Palestinian Female BB 
13 Vivian Israeli Female IEA 
14 Beth Israeli Female IEA 
15 Rashid Palestinian Male IEA 
16 Omar Palestinian Male MOPE 
17 Ilias Palestinian Male MOPE 
18 Mahmod Palestinian Male MOPE 
19 Lina Israeli Female MOPE 
20 Daniel Israeli Male MOPE 
21 Michael Israeli Male MOPE 
22 Jacob   (Facilitator) Israeli Male MOPE 
23 Ariell Israeli Female FD 
24 Hanin Palestinian Female FD 
Table 2: Participants interviewed 
 
I recruited a sample of 24 participants for in-depth conversations. In order to protect the 
participants’  confidentiality  the  presentation  of  the  people  involved  is  done  on a more 
general basis. This is due to the fact that the Israeli and Palestinian peace community is 
small and interlinked. Therefore there might be a risk that participants will be recognized if 
age, profession, geographical locations, as well as the name of the dialogue groups are 
presented simultaneously.  
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The participants chosen for the interviews signify a non-representative sample of Israeli and 
Palestinian participants (Bryman 2004). As already outlined in the methodology, all of them 
are fluent English speakers. English skills often suggest a high level of educational 
achievement, and since I was only able to interview English-speaking people, the ones with 
less educational background were largely left out for this research. Especially elderly 
uneducated Palestinian women were difficult to recruit. The majorities of the participants 
were either students or were holding professions such as lawyers, teachers, social workers, 
or were working in different human rights organizations and joint activities. Another similar 
factor that characterizes the chosen group, which distinguish them from the general Israeli 
and Palestinian population, is that they all encompass an interest and motivation to pursue 
dialogue in the sense that they have volunteered to join. However, given the qualitative 
nature of the research, the use of a non-representative sample is not necessarily 
problematic, as the intent is not to generalize to the entire populations of Palestine and 
Israel. However, the sample does to some extent reflect a diversity of Palestinians and 
Israeli in terms of geographic localization, gender, age, and also religious and political 
background. This will be further elaborated in the following.   
 
5.2.1. Gender 
An effort was made to recruit both men and women for this research. This is due to the fact 
men and women often perceive peace and war in diverse and gendered ways (Sharoni 
1994).Therefore it was preferable to receive voices from both perspectives, due to the fact 
that they might perceive the dialogue encounters in unlike ways. Here is an overview of the 
interviewed participants in terms of gender:   
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Figure 1: Distribution of interviewed participants across gender and social identity. 
It turned out that it was easier to recruit Israeli women for the research than Israeli men. 
This might have something to do with the fact that it exists a powerful environment of 
women’s  of  peace  groups  within  the  Israeli  society (Moore 2011). Several of them are 
initiated by women who ideologically are secular Jews and on the left side of politics, which 
opposes the occupation and have decided to act for peace, justice and nonviolence (Moore 
2011). The Israeli women were also very visible in the joint programs that this research is 
based on, and they were overrepresented in numbers compared to the Israeli men in the 
mixed groups. However, on the Palestinian side it was the opposite. In the gender blended 
groups there were more Palestinian men than women present, and in the IEA no Palestinian 
women were present at all. This might have something to do with the firmly established 
gendered roles that exist in Palestine - especially in the Palestinian villages- were the 
women are often restricted to homemaking, while the men usually are the ones that 
represent the families outwards (Hammack 2011). As already outlined this was one of the 
reasons  for  why  PCFF  decided  to  establish  a  women’s  group.  This  research  managed  to  get  
voices from all holds, however the balance is somehow uneven with the favor of the 
women. 
 
Israeli women 42% 
Israeli men 12% 
Palestinian women 25% 
Palestinian men 21% 
Distribution of interviewed participants 
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5.2.2. Age  
When choosing dialogue groups as well as interviewing participants I was aware of the fact 
that I wanted to integrate a wide specter of age within the research. This is due to the fact 
that elderly and younger participants might also perceive the dialogue encounters different. 
Therefore the participants ranged in age from 20 to 76 years, which the following table 
illustrates.   
 
Age  Palestinian 
female  
Palestinian 
male 
Israeli 
female 
Israeli 
male 
Total 
20-30 4  1 1 6 
30-40  3 3 1 7 
40-50 1  3 1 5 
50-60 1 1 1  3 
60-70   1  1 
70-80  1 1  2 
Table 3: Age distribution of interviewed participants 
            
Due  to  the  age  difference,  the  participants’  experience  from  dialogue  groups  also  varied.  
Some of the participants -especially the elderly Israeli women - have been attached to 
dialogue encounters for more than ten years, while other again – especially the younger 
participants - had only been a member of a dialogue program for more or less a year.  
5.2.3. Religious and political background  
Before I entered the field I was of the opinion that there is often people belonging to the 
more moderate side of religious and political spectrum that seek to join dialogue groups.  
This assumption turned out to be right, however there were some exceptions.  
 
On the Palestinian side the majority stated that they were Muslims, which do mirror the 
general religious statistics in the OPT. The Muslims do also outnumber the Christians 
substantially among the Palestinian participants in the dialogue groups that this research is 
based on. Only one of the interviewed Palestinian women did belong to the Christian 
minority. Not all of the Palestinians wanted to reveal their political belonging, and some did 
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also express that they did not engage into politics at all, due to the fact that they have lost 
faith in them. However, the majority of the Palestinian participants that revealed their 
political background belonged to the more moderate side of the political spectrum of the 
politics, mainly through the secular Fatah movement that rules the West Bank. Three of the 
Palestinian participants that were interviewed had spent some time of their lives behind 
Israeli bars due to their political activities in Fatah, where one of them had spent all 
together 18 years of his life in prison. This thesis did not manage to find people that belong 
to the more militant side of the politics, Hamas. One reason might be that most people that 
belong to this political position do rarely engage in joint activities. 
 
On the Israeli side I had the opportunity to interview participants with a wider range of 
politically and ideological background. The majority of the Israeli participants stated that 
they belong to the left wing political ideology in Israel. Most of the Israeli on the left wing do 
call for an end to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories (Hammack 2011). The 
majority of them – especially among the younger Israeli participants - stated that they also 
belonged to the religious secular divide, which will say that religion did not have a significant 
role  in  their  lives.  However,  there  were  also  some  “leftist”  -especially among the elderly 
women - that stated that Judaism were outmost important for them. They were highly 
attached to their religion and to the Jewish land, but still they were arguing for an 
independent Palestinian state in the OPT. In addition I had the opportunity to interview five 
Israeli participants that stated that they belonged to the more right wing government’s  
policies, primarily due to the security concerns. They perceived themselves as more 
religious than the other interviewed participants. Two of them lived in an Israeli settlement 
on the West Bank and one of them stated that she came from a conservative Orthodox 
Jewish family.  
 
5.2.4. Geographical locations   
There was substantial geographical diversity of where and how the Palestinian and Israeli 
participants live. On the Palestinian side this research brought me to people located from 
north to south on the West Bank as well as East Jerusalem. Some of the participants came 
from smaller villages such as Beit Omar, while others lived in a refugee camp located close 
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to Bethlehem. Other participants again lived in bigger cities such as Ramallah, Nablus, East 
Jerusalem and Hebron. Growing up in a small village is quite different from that of someone 
who has for example spent their whole life in downtown Ramallah. Participants that are 
attached to the smaller villages most often come from a social life that is relatively more 
conservative that what is being found in many of the bigger cities (Hammack 2011). On the 
Israeli side the participants that were interviewed to this research were spread between 
cities such as Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jaffa, West Jerusalem and to an Israeli settlement that is 
located on the West Bank. It is reason to believe that to live in an Israeli settlement is very 
different from living in cosmopolitan Tel Aviv. The people connected to the settlement are 
most often more conservative Jews, while Tel Aviv contains of multiple set of lifestyles and 
religious belonging. An additional factor is that several of the interview participants also 
were born other places in the world, and had later immigrated to Israel, mainly due to 
religious reasons. The countries were United States, Canada and Mexico.  
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6. Findings and Discussion Part 1: Perceived motivations and 
approaches to dialogue 
 
In the two following chapters I will present and discuss the data collected during the two 
months of fieldwork in Palestine and Israel. I will discuss dialogue as perceived from the 
perspective of the participants; how do they experience dialogue and how do they measure 
the value and effect of it. The discussion will concentrate on seven different themes divided 
between two chapters. It will be supported by a great amount of quotations from the 
conducted interviews. When quoting I will use their given pseudonyms. After the 
pseudonym follows one of together four codes that contains gender, identity and the name 
of the associated dialogue group:  
 
 Palestinian Female: PF/ The short name of the group 
 Palestinian Male:  PM/ The short name of the group 
 Israeli Female: IF/ The short name of the group 
 Israeli Male:  IM/ The short name of the group 
 
This chapter will present  and  discuss  the  participants’  perceptions  around  three  different  
themes:  
1) The infrastructure of avoidance 
2) Motivations for becoming involved in dialogue 
3) Participant’s  preference  to  the  different  structures  of  the  encounters  – politics 
versus the harmony model.  
 
6.1.  The infrastructure of avoidance  
 
There is a great disharmony between grassroots dialogue and the realities of the intractable 
conflict in Israel and Palestine (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007). Violence and grievance are an 
integrated part of their daily lives, especially on the Palestinian side. The physical 
infrastructure with the separation wall, the divided road systems, as well as myriads of 
checkpoints and roadblocks hinder the peoples to have any normal interactions with the 
other side. Instead, they are exposed to a biased public agenda, such as media and school 
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curriculums that most often give a monolithic and negative view about the other side. 
Therefore, despite the fact that most of the people in dialogue are likely to have had few if 
any “normal”  interactions  with  people  from  the  other  side,  they  never  start an encounter 
from scratch (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007). It is reason to believe that they have been 
colored by the mainstream generalizations that color the publics on both sides, and hence 
are entering the encounters with some set of psychological barriers and negative beliefs 
about one another. The next session will present some findings of prior stereotypes that 
participants perceived they were in position of before they became involved in dialogue.  
 
6.1.1. Perceived stereotypes about the other prior to dialogue  
Below is a table listing the most commonly found societal beliefs about the other side, prior 
to dialogue, as reported in the interviews. In several cases the same participant expressed 
more than one of the societal beliefs.  
 
Israeli prior societal beliefs Occurrences:  
“Thought  of  them  all  as  terrorists”   4 
“We  have  the  right  to  protect  ourselves  against  the  enemy” 5 
“Thought  that  all  they  want  to  do  is  to  throw  us  into  the  sea” 2 
“Thought  of  the  Palestinians  as  uneducated”   3 
“Have  never  had  nothing  against  them,  and  have  always  believed  in  
Palestinian  rights”   
6 
Table 4: Israeli societal beliefs prior to entering dialogue 
Palestinian societal beliefs Occurrences:  
“Thought  of  them  as  killers”   4 
“Thought  that  I  am  the  one  that  suffers,  not  them” 6 
“Thought  that  we  want  to  throw  them  into  the  sea” 4 
“Have  always  believed  that  Israeli  are  just  as  human  as  us.  It  is  the  military  
occupation that is wrong, not the  people”   
3 
Table 5: Palestinian societal beliefs prior to entering dialogue 
 
Findings from interviews indicate several repeated patterns of negative societal beliefs on 
both sides. What can be generalized from table 4 and 5 is that several of them fit into two of 
the shared societal beliefs that often are found in intractable conflicts, and serve as a 
57  
psychological justification for the deep division, which are Victimization and 
Dehumanization (Bar-Tal & Nets-Zehngut 2007). On the Palestinian side, the negative beliefs 
were mostly expressed by those who had grown up in refugee camps or in villages 
surrounded by Israeli settlements and checkpoints. Their previous regular contacts with 
Israeli were only with soldiers at the checkpoints and with the settlers. On the Israeli side, 
the most loaded negative stereotypes were mainly expressed by participants coming from a 
right wing political environment. Especially the two Israeli settlers claimed that they 
experienced a great amount of fear and hostility before they started to have contact with 
the other side.  
 
The first time I spent the time with them (Palestinians) was an encounter weekend with 25 
Palestinian youths from Nablus. It was very scary for me, because all people are telling you that they 
are all terrorists and they all want to kill you and throw you into the sea. And the people that is 
committing most of the terrorists attacks are young men, and this was who I was meeting and it was 
really scary seeing the 25 young potential terrorists like facing me and coming to sit next to me and 
talking  to  me,  and,  oh  my  god,  this  was  really  frightening  (…).  (Vivian IF/IEA)  
 
Several of the Palestinian participants claimed their victimhood by among others referring 
to the Nakba in 1948 and the many years with Israeli occupation. Israelis often referred to 
the deep-rooted fear they had for Palestinian terrorists attacks.  
 
The Palestinian society taught me how to hate and how to fight the Israeli. It also taught me to 
worry about that I am a refugee, that I live under occupation, and that I am suffering every day 
because  of  them.  (…)  And  so  the  other  side  (Israeli)  they  build  their  society  on  the  fear,  that  all  the  
Palestinians  are  terrorists,  and  that  we  will  throw  them  all  into  the  sea  (…). (Ali PM/ PCFF)    
 
In addition, the participants repeatedly mentioned that they were holding a prior image of 
the other side as killers and terrorists, which can be classified as dehumanization. As 
indicated in the conceptual chapter, it is common in an intractable conflict to make the 
other side less human in order to make it easier to legitimize violent actions towards each 
other.  
The following two examples from the findings illustrate this. Michael IM/MOPE expressed: 
“(…)  The  main  stereotype  that  I  had  was  the  image  of  Arabs  as  being  uneducated  (…)  It  is  
about stereotypes of course, like we used to say that Arabs are cruel, Arabs kill, and they are 
uneducated  and  small  heads  (…)”. Palestinian Sara PF/PCFF stated: “They  (Isareli)  only  knew  
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us as killers, and only picture I knew from them are solders that are destroying and attack 
and  kill,  and  I  didn’t  really  see  the  other  side  as  humans  (..)”.  
 
However, as seen in Table 4 and Table 5, there were participants from both sides that had 
positions of less prior dominant fear and negative beliefs about the others. What they had 
in common was that they had either been exposed to normal interaction with the other side 
through their parents – two of the three Palestinian participants have family that have had 
Israeli business relations -,  or  they  came  from  a  “leftist”  home  that  are  fighting  against  the  
occupation. The latter occurred mostly on the Israeli side. An Israeli example is Hannah IF 
from PCFF. She is quoted: “My view of Palestinians was not changed after I joined the PCFF, 
because  I  have  always  believed  into  human  rights,  and  in  the  left  wing.  (…)  My  parents  have  
always been working active for peace, and when my sibling died they became even more 
active”.  Mona PF/BB can serve as examples on the Palestinian side:  
 
My father had job in business were he deals with Israeli all the time through his business, so for me 
not a bad idea to deal with Israeli. But for Palestinians in the group that have not had relations 
through business, I saw that they cannot connect with Israeli, it was hard for them to deal with them 
directly, so for me I went there I made friends from them, and we went out together in Germany.   
 
   
To sum it up, participants with no experiences of interaction with the other side had greater 
negative stereotypes prior to dialogue than the people that have had some form of normal 
interactions prior to meetings. It is reason to believe that participants had already had a 
chance to challenge and modify the mainstream negative societal beliefs through the 
influence by their family members, and through some sort of normal contact with the other 
side. This supports what is being stated in the contact hypotheses; that the roots of hatred 
and prejudice comes from the absence of normalized contact between the two sides 
(Doubilet 2007).   
 
6.1.2.  Normalization  
A tendency in intractable conflicts is that voluntarily contacts with the enemy, such as 
dialogue, are perceived as ineffective and often socially unacceptable. The barrier of 
entering dialogue encounters are often perceived as high, and most people therefore 
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remain socially distant. For the participants interviewed as part of this thesis, it was clear 
that the Palestinian participants perceived entering dialogue as more challenging than what 
it was perceived by the Israeli participants. It has most probably coherence with the 
imbalance in power between the two sides. As outlined in the theoretical foundation, 
Israelis and Palestinians face very diverse realities; with one side being the occupier and the 
other side being occupied. Palestinians are living under the rule of the Israeli forces, with 
restricted freedom of movement, curfews, and checkpoints. Many also face a daily fear of 
shooting, killing and house demolitions. The injustice of occupation has created a severe 
stigmatization of voluntary social contact with the other side. Palestinians who support 
dialogue efforts therefore often pay a high price in their occupied communities. While it is 
inconvenient for the Israeli to be in dialogue it is, according to Ilias PM/MOPE, directly 
dangerous for many Palestinians.  Many of them fear for their lives, families, professions 
and property. Omar PM/ MOPE serves as an example of this, in the sense that he has 
experienced loss of customers to his business after joining dialogue. Due to this he has faced 
great economical difficulties. He also expressed that many of the: “(…)  people  in  my  society  
think that I am very crazy when they hear that I am sleeping with the Israeli in Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem  under  the  same  roof,  and  some  of  them  won’t  even  speak  with  me  now.”    Another 
Palestinian participant that has experienced punishment for his attendance in dialogue was 
Rashid PM/ IEA. He lost many friends at the University after he organized an academic 
student project between Israeli and Palestinian students, and is quoted: “When  I  came  back  
(after the dialogue seminar) I found out that the big highlight was that Rashid is bringing 
Palestinian youth to be brainwashed and to sit with the  enemy.  (…)  Many  cut  the  friendship  
with  me  then,  because  they  considered  me  as  the  enemy.  And  I  felt  very  ashamed”.  
 
Ilias PM/MOPE argued that many more Palestinians actually want to interact with the other 
side, but they resist in fear of the negative reactions and consequences from their peers. As 
seen in chapter 2 there is a tendency that violent conflicts create unified societal beliefs that 
strictly define how members should think, feel and behave towards the other, as well as 
towards each other. These shared societal beliefs often give members of a society a sense of 
security and belonging. It is therefore reason to believe that many people agree to attitudes 
and reasoning that they do not actually believe in, due to the wish of gaining acceptance 
from their society.  
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Interaction with the other side was expressed as less problematic for the Israeli participants, 
where like-minded family and friends mainly surrounded them.  
 
No I have not faced much negative reactions, no, not really, but I think most of my friends are left 
wing  (…)  and  most  of  them  believe  that  solution  is  peace,  and  giving  settlement  back,  but  most  of  
the  people  feel  that  they  don’t  have  to  do  something  about  the  conflict,  they  do  believe  in  dialogue,  
but like we have our lives like  we  are  living  in  a  bubble,  and  they  don’t  see  any  reason  for  why  they 
must be active for peace (Hannah IF/ PCFF). 
 
 
What the above quotes illustrate is a more passive attitude towards dialogue rather than 
the aggressive attitude expressed by the Palestinians. This might again be connected to the 
different realities of the conflict, where there is easier for the Israelis to create a distinctive 
separation between their day-to -day-lives and the conflict. However, it is reason to believe 
that the Israeli leftists also meet tough criticism from several holds in their society, some 
even being perceived as traitors. This became visible when I attended one of the regular 
demonstrations composed by the peace-group Women in Black. It is a group that is 
constituted of Israeli women of all ages, which are against the Israeli occupation in the OPT 
(Moore 2011). Every Friday they demonstrate in a roundabout in West Jerusalem (the Israeli 
part of Jerusalem), with signs that say, “stop the occupation”. The feedback from the Israeli 
people passing by was outmost harsh and critical, several people yelled and tended to be 
aggressive. However, the Israeli settlers experienced similar negative and harsh reactions 
from their society, as what was being expressed by the Palestinian participants. This can be 
seen in relation to the fact that Israeli connected to the settlements are often more to the 
extreme political right (Hammack 2011). The Israeli women referred to judgments similar to 
what was expressed by the majority of the Palestinians. They stated:  
 
I  think  I  was  very  scared  of  people  reactions  (…)  the  community  I  live  in  is  in  general  very  right  wing  
in Likhud, and even more right wing. So it is very black and white, Jews and Arabs. So I felt that I was 
making waves for me to do something that  was  kind  of  against  that,  and  I  think  I  didn’t  dare  telling  
my husband about that in the beginning. And also my children, I was kind of embarrassed over for 
them  as  well” (Beth IF/IEA). 
 
 “People  thought  I  was  crazy,  they  said  that  they  could  be  friends  with you for 20 years and 
then  they  will  take  a  knife  and  they  will  kill  you  (…)  it  was  scary  to  hear  that” (Vivian IF/ IEA).  
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Vivian also explained how she received many threats by email from her peers when they 
found out that she was inviting Palestinians to her house. It is therefore reason to believe 
that they paid a higher price for walking against the general consensus towards dialogue 
than what was experienced by the other Israeli participants.  
 
To conclude, there exists an infrastructure of social exclusion on both sides. Challenges 
concerning social exclusion were expressed more as a challenge by the Palestinian 
participants, however it was visible on the Israeli side as well. When risking facing negative 
reactions from the society one may assume that the decision of entering dialogue is not an 
easy choice to make. There may therefore be strong motivational factors behind their 
decisions of becoming involved in dialogue groups, in order to make participants willing to 
risk the stigmatization they might be exposed to by friends, family and the overall society.  
 
6.2. Motivations for becoming involved in dialogue  
All of the interviewed participants had willingly chosen to be involved in dialogue. The 
majority of them had received an invitation from a friend or by a family member that was 
already involved. A few others had actively looked for it themselves, and hence found 
information about dialogue programs in newspapers or on the Internet. There were several 
factors that contributed to the decision to join. Both sides repeatedly expressed some 
unified motivational factors for joining dialogue. However, there is also a clear motivational 
distinction between Israeli and Palestinian participants. The following outlines the common 
motivations among the 24 interviewed participants, starting first with a presentation of the 
motivations that were shared by both sides, followed by a section that looks at the 
separating ones.  
 
6.2.1. Unified motivations  
The most common motivations shared by both groups were:  
 The need to create a better future in the region 
 The need to correct negative images about own group held by the other side  
 Motivated by curiosity and the possibility to travel abroad 
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The majorities of Israeli and Palestinian participants described the greatest motivation to be 
rooted in the responsibility to create a better future in the region. The price of being in war 
had for many become so high that they were motivated to do something about it. Several 
explicitly mentioned that they felt obliged to create a better future for their children. This 
was especially dominant among those participants that had lost a close family member or 
friend due to the violent conflict.  
 
The guy founded it, he was interviewed in the paper and the minute I heard him talk that minute I 
knew  that  this  is  the  place  that  I  want  to  be,  you  know,  it  was  I  have  lost  my  son,  but  I  hadn’t  lost  my  
sanity, it must be people that know a different way of just hating or being angry, it just had to be (…)  
We have to change this terrible reality and, solving the conflict is  a  two  ways  of  course  (…)  peace  
also has to come with inner change if seeing the other side as human and not enemy (Elisheba 
IF/PCFF). 
 
I want to keep my children alive, my children are so expensive. I am a mother. I wanted to join 
dialogue  because  I  want  to  keep  them.  I  don’t  want  my  daughter  to  have  the  same  experience  to  
loose her brother, because it will destroy her forever. So we have to stop to fight and start talking 
(Sara PF/PCFF). 
 
In addition to changing the harsh reality, several participants on both sides were motivated 
by the need to correct negative stereotypes of their own group held by the others.  The 
Palestinians were motivated to show that they are not all terrorists, and the Israeli 
participants were eager after showing that there are other Israeli people than the extreme 
settlers and violent soldiers on the checkpoints. The third motivation shared by both sides 
was curiosity. On the Palestinian side it was both directed to the curiosity of traveling 
abroad as well as to the curiosity of meeting the other side. Three Palestinians mentioned 
this, and they were all in the twenties, or had been in the twenties that time the workshop 
took place. Zeina PF/BB is quoted: “Somebody  asked  me  for  going,  and  in  the  beginning  I did 
not think about it seriously, I was just interested to see, and OK, we are going to have fun, it 
is a trip to Europe. Mona PF/BB claimed: “The  factors  that  made  me  join..hm….Maybe  
because it was in another country and I was curious and I wanted to go and see”. For many 
Palestinians there can be a challenge to travel abroad due to the limitation of movements, 
difficulties in receiving a visa, as well as widespread poverty in the region. When receiving 
an opportunity to go abroad it might then for many Palestinians be tempting accept. On the 
Israeli side the curiosity was mainly directed to the interest of meeting the other side, in 
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order to fulfill limitation of knowledge to the conflict. Five Israeli participants fit into this 
category, examples of their attitudes follows in the quotes below: 
 
I was very curious to find out more about the conflict. I have a very good friend that is very left, and 
then I have my husband that is also very close to me and he works in the military, and through both 
of them I saw different perspective about the war in Gaza, and now I was curious to find out more 
about what was my own opinions about the conflict (Hadas IF/BB). 
 
I think that I kind of had a  feeling  that  I  didn’t  have  the  whole  story  that  it  was  a  lot  of  stuff  going on 
with the Palestinians that I was sort of kind of responsible for because it was my government and my 
country, but I had not really looked at them in the face to see what was going on, and I knew that I 
was going to learn stories and things that was going to make me very uncomfortable. But it was 
more important for me to know and deal with the knowledge instead of not knowing and going 
around thinking that everything is fine (Beth IF/IEA).   
 
6.2.2. Different realities create different motivations 
Despite several similarities in motivations, the findings also indicated a clear separation 
between the two sides, which again can be rooted in the different realities. It is basically 
two patterns:  
 Palestinians:   Educate the Israeli about injustices related to the Israeli occupation 
 Israelis:            Evolve personal friendship 
 
A great amount of Palestinian participants indicated that they were motivated by the fact 
that dialogue represent a platform were they can educate the other side on the perceived 
injustices related to the military occupations that dominate their lives. A few even described 
dialogue as another kind of war, where they were fighting with words rather than with 
weapons. The majority of the Palestinian participants that fronted this view had for a time 
been politically active and tried to improve the situation by arranging political 
demonstrations. Three of the Palestinian participants explained that they had even spent 
some time in prison due to their political engagement in Fatah. In the end they had realized 
that a more efficient alternative to political demonstration and activism was rather personal 
face-to-face meetings with the other side. Two quotations will in the following exemplify 
this:   
 
The last time I was in prison I started to think what will happen to the next generation, what will 
happen to my sons? How can we can stop it, and solve the problem. It made me start thinking in 
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another direction. (…). Dialogue is another kind of war. I went to enter this relation to fight. I am 
trying to convince the Israeli people that sit in front of me tat we have to stop this conflict (Ali 
PM/MOPE).  
 
Before I talked to the Israeli and sending them my message by stones during Intifada, you know, but 
now I rather tell them about my feelings and sending the Israeli a special message through dialogue. 
The best way of sending the message is by face-to-face talking without army or newspapers or TV 
(Ilias PM/MOPE).  
 
The Palestinian focus on wanting to educate the opponents about their misery may be 
related to the fact that Palestinians face little institutional support (Jad 2011). While the 
majority of Israelis are in position of among others a strong military army and laws that 
favor their interests, the Palestinians do not have such institutions that can prevent the 
abuse (Doubilet 2007). Palestinians must therefore base their struggle to a higher degree on 
grassroots level activities, where dialogue work can be regarded as one of them. These 
encounters therefore represent a forum where they can struggle for their rights. When no 
one else can fight for their justice, they have to do it themselves. One example might be Ali 
PM/ PCFF that is  quoted:  “Dialogue is not a kind of normalization but resistance, struggle, 
freedom fighter. It is about that we want to show the human side of the conflict”.  
 
This fighting spirit was less dominant among the Israeli participants that were interviewed. 
They were rather motivated by psychosocial dimensions with dialogue, in the sense that 
they were much more eager to listen and to learn from the stories of the Palestinians, as 
well as to evolve personal friendships with the other side. The majority of the Israeli that 
expressed this point of view perceived themselves as leftists, which for many years have 
been fighting to end the Israeli occupation. Now they wanted to express their solidarity with 
the Palestinian people through being involved in dialogue.  
 
The activists started in my head, I talked about justice and I knew that everybody deserve the 
freedom,  it  was  slogans  that  I  really  believed  in,  but  I  didn’t  really  understand  what  it  meant  or  felt  
in  the  stomach.  (…)  I  wanted  the Palestinians to change from symbols that I am fighting for to 
personal human beings that I really care for. Wanted to have a chance to meet people down to 
earth. I was very curious (Rachel IF/ BB) 
 
The urge for making personal friendships might have a relation to the fact that several 
Israelis feel ashamed over many of the actions taken by the Israeli government. It may be 
that they dislike their Israeli identity as being an occupier, an identity they do not want to be 
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connected to.  Elisheba (IF/PCFF) is quoted: “Sometimes I am overnice, because I just want 
them to have a good feeling about Israeli. I feel like I have all the Israeli guilt on my 
shoulders, you know, that I have to make up for all the terrible things that we do in the 
country  (…).  “ She took a clear distance from Israel as being an oppressing power, however 
at the same time she felt very connected to the country. Repeatedly she expressed her 
belonging to the region, and the wish to ensure that Israel remains a country for Jewish 
people alongside with the existence of a Palestinian state. The dilemma of hating and at the 
same being highly attached to the country was something that was reflected upon among 
several of the Israeli participants.  As Beth IF/IEA was expressing:  
 
I do believe this is a Jewish land, it is very clear from the Bible that this is the Jewish land and it is a 
holy place, but I also believe that the Jews have the responsibility to not be oppressors, because we 
have  been  oppressed  for  so  many  centuries,  so  I  don’t  know  how  to  fit  that  together, I just cant 
figure that out. 
 
What Beth described was the transformation from being an oppressed minority to 
becoming the occupying power and the oppressor, which she found very difficult and 
disappointing. 
It is reason to assume that one of the motivating factors for being related to dialogue is 
therefore the wish of transforming Israel into a country one can be proud of, and hence 
escape the feeling of guilt.  
 
The different expectations to the dialogue groups created a dilemma for several of the 
Israeli participants, especially the one connected to BB. Two of the interviewed Israeli 
women from BB experienced to be met with an expectation by the Palestinian participants 
to only listen to  the  other  side’s  oppression and misery, and the expectation to voice their 
criticism of the Israeli occupation on the OPT. However, the Israeli participants expressed 
that they also needed to talk about their frustration and pain connected to the conflict. 
They also have a background of persecution, as well as pain and insecurity connected to 
Palestinians’  suicide  bombings and rockets attacks, which they needed the other side to 
hear. An example can be Maria IF/BB:  
 
In all the seminars we tried to say why we are here. We tried to proof that we also have a place 
here. Like in the beginning when we talked and introduced our selves. The Israeli used to say, we 
come here to listen because I know my part, and the Palestinians said that they only came to tell us 
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what is happening in the West Bank, but you cannot do two weeks with only listening. We also want 
to talk.  
 
 
The difference in motivation and expectation connected to the asymmetry might easily be a 
source to misunderstandings and frustrations between Israeli and Palestinian participants. 
The Israeli and Palestinian BB facilitator especially reflected this upon, and uttered this as 
one of the main challenges to the workshop.  
 
Most of the left winged oriented who have some experience with activism; some of them come 
because they want to meet Palestinians and make friends.  Palestinians  don’t  necessarily  want  that,  
and sometimes they say that we are mainly and not at all here to be friends. (..)The asymmetry is 
very difficult because not everybody sees it. Some Israeli become very defensive when you want to 
reflect on the power  relations  and  asymmetry  because  they  don’t  experience  the  daily  life  for  
Palestinians (Rachel IF/BB). 
 
The Palestinian facilitator Noor PF/ BB outlined similar challenges. She referred to a fight 
that happened between an Israeli and Palestinian girl in the very first evening of the 
seminar: “The Palestinian said that I am coming here only to tell you what is happening and I 
don’t  want  to  talk  to  you.  That  of  course  hurt  the  Israeli  girl,  and  she  said  you  are  coming  
here  to  meet  Israeli,  so  why  don’t  you want to talk to me. So they burst into tears and they 
yelled  and  it  was  unbelievable”. 
 
As seen in the conceptual foundation several explain the structural asymmetry between the 
conflicting groups as one of the main challenges to dialogue. Critics claim that the different 
motivations and expectations to the encounters have the potential to lead the two sides 
further apart instead of closer together. Sari Hanafi (2007) refers to several encounters with 
limited success, due to failed ability  to  address  the  different  side’s  motivations  and  
expectations. One of them was a joint meeting that took place between Israeli and 
Palestinian teachers in 1996. “While  the  meeting  started  warmly,  it  finished  in  violence  
between the two groups, with Palestinians feeling that no common ground had been 
reached wit the counterparts” (Hanafi 2007: 75). She concludes the article by questioning 
the current form in which the dialogue programs are conducted. She believes that in order 
to succeed they must pay attention to the imbalanced reality, or else will especially not the 
Palestinians expectations be met. The dialogue groups chosen for this research vary greatly 
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in both structure and content. Some do pay attention to this imbalance, while others do 
not. This will be further discussed in the following paragraph.  
 
6.3.  Different contents to dialogue: Harmony model vs. politics  
As seen in section 5.1, is the ultimate goal for all of the dialogue groups to end the ongoing 
violence between Israel and Palestine. However, the content that each of the dialogue 
groups use for reaching this goal differs. As seen in the theoretical foundation some of the 
groups are influenced by the human-relation traditions, while others are influenced by the 
conflict-resolution traditions. Dialogue groups are often not leaning towards only one end of 
the two traditions, but might involve factors from them both. However, it is visible in the 
groups’ goals and activities that one of the structures is favored over the other. The greatest 
difference between the two models is to which degree it perceives if one should pay 
attention to the imbalance of power between the two sides, by including political 
discussions on issues directly related to the conflict. The first tradition tries to a great 
degree to blurry the differences by rather emphasize common interests between the 
conflicting sides. PCFF and IEA more or less fit into this tradition. Others who sympathize 
with the conflict-resolution tradition claim that to blurry the difference can create 
difficulties for many Palestinians participants and make them a struggle during the sessions. 
One must rather deal with the inevitable asymmetry by being aware of it and put it in the 
open. The dissonance between Israeli and Palestinians must rather be expressed not 
repressed in order to have a genuine dialogue.  As seen in section 5.1 BB, MOPE and to 
some degree FD fit under this tradition.  
 
The following will discuss the great variation in opinions between the interviewed members 
on which type of content that creates a most genuine and successful dialogue. The following 
table illustrates the three major differences in perceptions of the dialogical contents. 
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Participants preferred content of the encounters  Palestinians  Israeli  
Focus on political issues related to the conflict  7 4 
Focus on commonalities rather than their political differences  1 
Focus on commonalities rather than political differences. However, 
when a solid relationship is built, there will be room for political 
discussions  
4 8 
Table 6: Preferred structure of encounters 
 
 
6.3.1. Commonalities should be in focus, not the differences 
The majority of the participants related to the human-relation traditions in IEA, and PCFF 
stated that excluding political talks in the temporary encounters did not mean that they will 
exclude it in the future. A common answer was that in order to be able to talk politics they 
first have to establish a solid relationship, which only happens when difficult issues are 
shunted aside and the focus is placed mainly on their commonalities. Two examples can 
illustrate this:  
 
You have to forget about all the anger and all the blame and leave it outside, and come with a clean 
heart and brain in order to talk in sense, and that is what the PCFF is, you know, and there have to 
be a lot of trust being built up first before really you can go into negotiation. And for many of them 
now  there  is  trust  and  then  they  can  even  be  a  bit  angry  at  each  other,  you  know,  (…)  and  yes,  I  think  
we have to talk more. Ready to talk politics now, and I think we should (Elisheba IF/PCFF). 
 
 In the beginning I felt ashamed when starting to dialogue with settlers, but after deciding that the 
focus  will  be  on  religion  then  it  didn’t  feel  that  anymore,  because  then  we  focus  on  something  that  
are same on both side. But politically it will be hard, because we consider the settlement to be our 
land. Focusing on religion will not say that it will never involve political dialogue one day. We are 
only starting it, and the only thing that works in the beginning is secondary discussions. The extreme 
they will not discuss or negotiate, but they can sit down and then the next step will maybe be to 
negotiate. It is a process. The goal is that the religious dialogue will change the settler minds, and 
then we can make political discussions in the future (Rashid PM/IEA). 
 
This stands in opposition to what  is  argued  in  the  article  “The  Peace Builders  Paradox”, 
written by (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007) that claims that shunting away political issues does 
not lead to the establishment of a solid relationship, but rather hinders the establishment of 
genuine trust and relationship among the members: “…because the elephant in the room 
syndrome  persists  until  the  issue  is  tackled”  (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007: 60). However, as 
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Rashid PM/MOPE further emphasized was that in order to reach a wider specter of the 
population, including the right wings of both sides, it is impossible to begin the encounters 
with politics, due to the fact that they are so distant from each other in their perceptions 
around conflict and peace.  
 
I think the extreme can sit together. Like me, I am not right or extreme, but still it was very hard to 
meet Israeli in the beginning. But I took the first step, and now it is very easy. The extreme need this 
first step without political discussions, first they will only sit down with the other side, and then the 
next step will maybe be to discuss. It is a process.  
 
Among all the interviewed participants it was only Vivian IF/ IEA that stated that she was 
against all types of political discussions, also in the future. Politics is something that she 
claimed should be left for the politicians and not the average people. As she stated: “ I 
found the political groups to be too angry and wanted to destroy, and focusing so much on 
the occupation  and  give  that  too  much  attention  to  it  and  it  just  won’t  work,  because  then  
you  don’t  see  the  other  side  and  it  is  not  balanced”.  Her insistence of separating religious 
and political discussions may be a way of escaping internal guilt. It is reason to believe that 
she was being defensive because she knows that the settlement she is living in is by many 
being regarded as illegal, and it may therefore feel uncomfortable to touch on such topics. 
As she was stating: 
 
Anybody should have the chance to live anywhere, it is only the government that tells me that this is 
over  the  green  line  so  I  don’t  believe  in  that  (…).  I  feel  very  strong  that  where  I  am  living  is  morally  ok  
but  not  politically  ok,  but  I  don’t  want  or  will  be  politically  correct,  because  if  I  was  that  I  wouldn’t  be  
having contact with Palestinians (..).  
 
However, it is reason to believe that the attempts of excluding politics from dialogue 
encounters may be challenging, if not impossible, in an ongoing conflict. It was obvious that 
the Palestinians in the dialogue groups connected to the human-relation approach had, 
despite the non political design, an urge for touching on political issues, by among others 
showing the Jewish participants the cost of occupations in the territories. This became 
visible in what was being expressed in the interviews, and also during the fieldwork 
participations in the dialogue meetings in PCFF and IEA. While the dialogue sessions were 
purely centralized towards non-political talks, the unofficial discussions before and after the 
meetings were touching on political topics. One example can be the question of bringing 
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Palestinians to Israel or to the Israeli settlement, which alone touches on highly political 
aspects. The Palestinians always have to apply to the Israeli government for permission, and 
cross Israeli military checkpoints in order to reach to the meetings. Some times they never 
show up due to the difficulties, or are coming several hours too late, which creates 
frustrations and exhaustions among the Palestinian members. It is reason to believe that for 
Palestinians living under occupation everything is in a way about politics. It does not matter 
what issues that are being raised; it all comes back to politics. Rashid PM/ IEA serves as an 
example to this. Despite the fact that IEA is purely religious and not political he was stating:  
 
We are in war, not with weapons but with thinking. (..) I believe we need to give them (Israeli) proof 
(..) so my job is to bring them (Israeli) here to show them Check Points, the Wall and explain them 
about permits conditions, how it takes many hours to get it and how you have to write applications 
to go to hospital. Settlers believe it and they always cry, and feel ashamed that they are Israeli, and 
some say that they are so disappointed about their government. 
 
6.3.2. Dealing with the differences  
On the other hand BB, MOPE and to some extent the FD is/were a site for political 
discussions, much inspired by the conflict-resolution approach. The majority of the 
participants related to these dialogue groups argued that the encounters must consist of 
more than only a place were stereotypes are shattered and you are able to recognize each 
other as human beings. If dialogue groups should be effective they must also challenge the 
power asymmetries created by the occupation. While the human-relations approach is 
concerned that by confronting the asymmetrical power relations could result in polarizing 
the groups even further, several of the people interviewed in MOPE and BB stated that they 
were afraid of the opposite. A soft religious and cultural gateway to political discussions is 
according to the Israeli facilitator for MOPE, Jacob IF/ MOPE, not preferable. The conflicting 
issues must start sooner rather than later for the dialogue to be based on real feelings 
among the participants. He claimed that by creating a micro cosmos of equality and 
harmony that does not represent the conflicting reality, and by not addressing the two 
groups real feelings, might lead to a polarization and an escalation of negative attitudes 
between the opponents, rather than building trust between them. This is due to the fact 
that the daily grievance experienced by the Palestinian participants and also to some extent 
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by the Israeli participants does not find a proper way of being aired during the encounters. 
Jacob IF/ MOPE is quoted:  
 
In  the  political  workshop  we  eat  and  are  friendly  and  we  don’t  want  to  go  back  to  the  negotiation,  
but there is no short cuts. Think about it as a student that wants to finish the assignment. As much 
as he wants to postpone it, the bigger the problem will be. You have to face it and discuss it, you 
cannot choose the easy way.  
 
According to Nimer and Lazarus (2007) it is common that people use public opinions when 
they discuss politics, argumentations that often are deeply interpreted through years with 
intractable conflict.  An interesting observation I did during the attendance in the political 
workshop MOPE is that even the Israelis and Palestinians that have worked and respected 
each other in less political dialogue encounters for a long time, turned back to their 
interpreted collective narratives when they started to discuss political issues. An example is 
Lina IF/MOPE and Omar PM/ MOPE. In addition to being two of the delegates in MOPE they 
had for several years joined another dialogue group together, and had therefore known 
each other for a long period of time. They experienced the political workshop in two very 
different ways. Omar perceived the political workshop as fruitful, while Lina perceived it as 
dysfunctional. Omar is quoted:  
 
The political dialogue good, much better than the other dialogue I have been involved in. Here we 
talked about serious issues, such as Jerusalem, security borders, settlements, and all of these points 
are serious. This kind of dialogue is better. To build trust between each other and bla bla, that is for 
children.  It  isn’t  working  (…).     
 
Lina, on the other hand, felt she was taking several steps back instead of forward in their 
relationships. She was surprised to see that Omar’s  attitude  became  much  more  polarized.  
She is quoted: “I was amazed because Omar is normally speaking in less drastically words, 
and here he comes and talks like he did in the beginning. Why? Because you are talking in 
front of people, and  are  afraid  to  compromise  about  this  and  this?”    Later on in the 
interview she stated:  
 
It was very hard and very disappointed, very much. Nothing result, and I wasted the whole weekend 
for  nothing.  We  didn’t  achieve  anything.  To  discuss  the  hard  core  about the borders was very 
difficult.  (…)  Doesn’t  say  that  they  (political  workshops)  does  not  work  in  general,  but  they  didn’t  
work for us.   
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It is reason to believe that Omar and Lina had very different expectations to the political 
workshop. For Omar it might have been much rooted in his overall motivations with 
dialogue, which is to teach the other side about their situation in the occupied territories. 
Omar therefore seemed satisfied with his opportunity to address issues related to the 
occupation, no matter outcome. Lina, on the other hand, anticipated that they would come 
to some political agreements, which did not happen. Instead she experienced that her 
Palestinian friend became more polarized and monolithic in his view.  
 
A heated discussion rooted in collective narratives is common in an early stage of political 
encounters (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007). Each side struggles to justify its version of history 
that they have been taught through years with intractable conflict. Abu-Nimer and Larazur 
further outline that such heated blame games can push participants out of their comfort 
zones, and deepen the dialogue, as a group often needs a breakdown in order to have a 
breakthrough (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007).  This is due to the fact that they after a while 
usually try to justify their stories of victimizations with personal stories that have happened 
to them and their family, where “Soft voices and tears replace the cacophony of the blame 
game”(Abu-Nimer & Lazarus 2007: 29).  It may be reason to believe that if the political 
workshop had lasted for more than a weekend the outcome in MOPE may have turned out 
differently. They may have reached the point of breakdown, but not the breakthrough in 
their political discussions.  A research conducted on grassroots dialogue by Moaz, Steinberg 
and Bar-On (2002) supports this argumentation. They were surprised to find out that the 
moments of true dialogue and empathy in the encounters paradoxically emerged through 
the dynamics of confrontations.  
 
In conclusion, there is a great diversity among the interviewed participants on what type of 
content they perceived as being most efficient. The division occurred first of all between 
participants involved in groups that were related to human-relation approach, and 
participants involved in groups related to the conflict-resolution approach. However, 
findings indicated another division rooted in the divergent needs among the Israeli and 
Palestinian participants, where Palestinians –also the participants connected to the human-
relation approach- had a stronger need to talk politics than what the Israeli participants had.  
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7. Findings and Discussion part II: The perceived value and effect by 
dialogue encounters  
 
A question repeatedly asked regarding dialogue in intractable conflicts, is the actual effect 
that it has on changing the psychological, social and the overall political situation. There is a 
gap, not only between groups, but also between members within groups in terms of what 
they believe they have accomplished with dialogue. When I raised this question during 
interviews, the answers varied. On one hand participants were filled with success and hope, 
but on the other hand they were filled with frustration. The following chapter will present 
and  discuss  the  participant’s  perceptions  around  this  subject.  It  is divided into four sections. 
The first concerns the perceived effect dialogue has on an individual level, and the second is 
related to the perceived effect they have on the overall political situation. The third section 
aims to explain the challenges and limitations to dialogue, where the last section presents 
and discusses participants’  future  outlook  on peace.   
 
7.3 The personal value of being together    
As described in 6.2, the majority of the participants explained that a strong initial motivation 
for getting involved in dialogue is the responsibility to change the conflicting reality. 
However, the majority of the participants mentioned that the greatest strength of 
grassroots dialogue is that participants get the opportunity to empathize with  the  opposite’s  
views and feelings. All of the interviewed participants expressed that they experienced 
some form of personal benefit in their change of perceptions towards the other group, or 
they had experienced changes in the attitudes of their opponents. This is in line with the 
conception that dialogue groups has a positive effect on reducing negative and hostile 
attitude among the participants, and lead the two sides closer together (Maoz 2000). The 
perceived personal transformation varied among the interviewed participants. Some stated 
the transformations as being related to specific topics connected to the conflict, while 
others articulated it as deep and meaningful, and for some, life changing transformations.  
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7.1.1. Personal life-changing transformations  
The participants in PCFF were the ones that most often expressed the deeper life-changing 
transformations. As previously described; PCFF is influenced by the human-relation 
approach; suggesting that individuals change their negative attitudes towards another 
group when they get the chance to discover that the others are human beings with feelings 
similar to their own. PCFF is focusing on the feeling of bereavement shared by people that 
have lost a beloved family member due to the conflict, a universal pain that cut across the 
conflicting lines. All of the participants interviewed from PCFF explained the first meeting as 
an emotional and meaningful experience. Some even referred to it as a life-changing 
moment. In the dialogue sessions they are revealing personal stories; how they lost their 
beloved ones and the pain related to that loss. Two examples can illustrate this:  
 
I saw them just as criminals with weapons, but when I saw them like human like me everything 
changed.  I  don’t  know  exactly  how  I  changed,  I  was  like  shocked  to  hear  the  stories  about  humans  in  
front of me. They want to kill us, want to live alone in this area that was my previous idea. After that 
when I met them as normal people without weapons and soldier-clothes without seeing that blood I 
don’t  know,  everything  changed.  (…).  I  started  to  listen  to  the  Jewish  mothers  and  that  moment  
something  changed.  I  don’t  know  exactly,  when I hear the women speak about the children it was so 
difficult  for  me.  I  don’t  know  how  but  I  started  to  cry  and  after  when  one  of  them  were  finish  
speaking  I  was  going  and  hug  her.  I  don’t  know  why  but  I  told  her  that  I  have  lost  my  grandmother  
and now you are my new grandmother. This woman was shocked, and she hugged me in a strong 
way, and that moment I really felt that she was my new grandmother and now we visit each other 
and call each other a lot on the phone. I love her (Kefaya PF/ PCFF).  
 
In the very first session that I joined we were sitting together Israeli and Palestinian in a circle and 
each told why they came to the Forum. Lost a mom, mother or a brother. Very heavy and everybody 
cried all the time. The outcome was that I realized that the pain is the same, and I realized that this 
could  be  something  very  meaningful  for  me.  (…)  The  first  Palestinian  woman  that  I  met  in  the  Forum,  
you know, she took me in, and we are very good friends ever since, very, very good friends (Miriam 
IF/PCFF). 
 
Above quotes describe a moment where stereotypes were being reduced, and trust and 
empathy was created with the other side. One reason for the sudden change can be that 
the main focus is on their painful personal experiences in loosing someone closely related, 
something people can relate to and feel empathy towards despite their political 
disagreements. Such stories told by the other side can help reveal that they also are in 
position of pain, sorrow, and fear just like themselves. Another factor for the sudden 
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personal transformation may be that PCFF is for many of the members just as much a 
therapeutically group as well as a reconciliation group. Members therefore often benefit 
from the group in several ways, due to the fact that within the group they find peer people. 
Despite all of their differences they find comfort and support by people that understand 
their pain, which is an understanding that they often do not find among people within their 
own societies who have not experienced such loss. As Miriam IF/PCFF further expressed: 
 
You know, after my son was killed I just wanted to symbolically go into a kind of bed, cover my head 
and stay there forever. I think PCFF has strengthened my core of life. You can come out. Like if you 
come out in the forum your son will be there, you know.  (..) It is a way of keeping my connection 
with him. 
 
7.1.2. New insight on the similarities between Islam and Judaism  
The religious dialogue group IEA is as already described based on the human-relation 
tradition, in the sense that they are focusing on commonalities between Judaism and Islam. 
However, participants that were interviewed from this group did not express the same 
immediate and deep change as seen in PCFF. However, there were some changes in 
perceptions, which have rather happened gradually. One example is Beth IF/IEA, which had 
to dwell for a little while over the question on whether she believed that her perceptions 
towards Palestinians had changed. After a little pause she answered:  
 
Yes, I think so. I can judge that after how I react to the Arabic workers that are rebuilding my house. 
Like before I went to this group I had a very strong feeling that when I hear Arabic language I felt 
that it was threatening, ugly and hostile to me. It was unconscious, but it was how I felt, and I  don’t  
feel like that anymore. Now I try  to  understand  what  they  say.  (…).  I now have a positive experience 
with the Arabic language, with people that I like speaking it, and when I hear the workers speaking it 
doesn’t  feel  so  threatening.   
 
Another example can be Vivian IF/IEA that explained: “I  am  always  surprised  of  how  similar  
Muslim is to Jewish religion, I keep discovering new things and I always saying wow this is 
the same as our, and that happen every time”.   
 
On the question of whether personal friendship has developed between Beth IF/IEA and 
other Palestinian participants in the group her immediate answer was no, due to the fact 
that she did not feel secure enough. In PCFF, on the other hand, several of the members 
described the evolvement of deep friendships between the Israeli and Palestinian members. 
76  
This happened especially between the members that share a common language. There can 
be several reasons for the different effects members of PCFF and IEA experienced. One 
reason can be that IEA uses cross-cultural learning method, rather than personal stories 
based on deep emotions as in PCFF.  The cross-cultural learning method is an exchange of 
basic information on issues such as Islamic and Jewish feasts, religious traditions, and family 
habits (Suleiman 2004a). The goal is that a new understanding of the others’ cultural 
traditions will bring members of the two groups closer together. Discussing cultural and 
religious traditions may not necessarily lead to the exchange of personal and intimate 
feelings. One can be a member of the group without extraditing one self, as they to a great 
extent are doing in PCFF.  Another reason may be that the people involved in IEA have a 
different personal characteristic than people in PCFF.  What is special with the religious 
dialogue groups is that it is between Jewish settlers and Palestinians living in a village next 
to the settlement. It could be that they are more polarized to each other than what the 
people in PCFF are. As previously outlined, Jewish settlers are often more to the extreme 
political right, and have a more dominant religious view, than other Israelis. If this is not the 
reality about the Jewish settlers in the dialogical program, they are at least surrounded by 
people in their neighborhood that most likely are more conservative in their way of 
thinking. Several of the Palestinians members have families that have experienced loss of 
property due to the establishment of that particular settlement. They have therefore a 
reason to be angrier with this specific group of Israeli people. It may therefore make them 
more susceptible to engage in dialogical interaction with each other. Due to their starting-
point, bringing Jewish settlers and neighboring Palestinians together in an encounter can 
therefore be regarded as an accomplishment by itself.  
 
There is another possible explanation to why the personal relationships between the 
participants have developed in different ways. In addition to the factors explained above, 
one can also supply the factor of time. According to the contact hypotheses, a positive 
relation between the two sides will increase if contact happens over longer period of time 
(Allport 1979). While several of the members interviewed in PCFF had been members for 
many years, the IEA had only existed for two years. This may indicate that if the members of 
IEA continue to meet over a long period of time the relation between the members may be 
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strengthened, and a deeper change in perception, and also the evolvement of deeper 
friendship can occur.  
 
 
7.1.3. New understanding around topics related to the conflict  
As outlined in 5.1, MOPE and BB can be linked to the conflict-resolution traditions where 
participants are supposed to relate to each other based on their group belonging and not as 
individuals. The goal is to bridge the conflicting differences and develop a belief that a 
common dream for the future is possible. The question is to which degree an atmosphere 
often characterized by anger and frustration are pushing people further away from each 
other, or whether it actually create a positive change of perceptions. Observations 
performed at  MOPE’s  two-day political workshop discovered that the atmosphere was more 
intense and angrier than what was observed in the meetings with PCFF and IEA. On several 
occasions people left the room, started to cry, and shouted loudly at each other. 
Participants that were interviewed from BB explained a similar type of atmosphere during 
the two-week workshop in Germany. Both Israeli and Palestinian participants in MOPE were 
repeatedly trying to prove that they were right, and were often using historical, and cultural 
arguments to legitimize their perspective. When political disagreements and conflicting 
interests are discussed, one may to a great extent expect such reactions. As Nimer & 
Lazarus (2007) describe  in  the  article  “The  Peace builders  Paradox”; the Israeli and 
Palestinian encounters are marked by interruptions, contradiction, and competition to 
convey each  side’s  narrative  of  victimhood. Despite the harsh atmosphere, the interviewed 
participants expressed several positive changes in their perceptions about the other. Worth 
noting is that the majority of the delegation from MOPE were already a member other 
dialogue networks, which might have meant that they already are in a position of more 
moderate attitudes towards the out-group before joining the political workshop. The 
majority of the members in BB, on the other hand, described the two weeks workshop to be 
their first time in dialogue with the other side.  
 
Changes in perceptions expressed by the participants were more directed to specific 
conflicting topics, which is in line with the result that the conflict-resolution tradition is 
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aiming for. It is reason to believe that this happened when they were exposed  to  the  other’s 
perspectives in the conflict. As seen in the findings, several of the interviewed participants 
in BB were surprised to find out that not all members of the opposing side are united in 
their extremist attitudes; instead there is a great variation of ideas and opinions. As Mona 
PF/ BB expressed: “I  met  an  ex  soldier  and  he  started  to  talk  to  me  about  his  experience  in  
life. He told me that they are going to the army obligatory, that Israel decide for them. I 
didn’t  know  that,  just  thought  they  went  because  they  wanted”.  Zeina PF/ BB on the other 
hand found it interesting to hear that there actually were soldiers trying to act and treat 
Palestinians nicely at the checkpoints. She is quoted: “I  found  many  of  them  having  member  
of family in the military, and they told us how they in the left party made it easier and less 
violent  for  the  Palestinians.  And  it  made  me  change  the  view  about  these  people”.   
 
As previously outlined, a common tendency in intractable conflicts is that both parties 
create their own collective memories, each representing a black and white picture that 
portrays their own society in a positive light, and at the same time delegitimizes their 
opponents (Bar-Tal & Nets-Zehngut 2007). By being exposed to new information from the 
other part, such as exemplified in the quotes of Zeina and Mona, participants may realize 
that the picture is not as black and white as they previously believed. Another example of 
such is Daniel IM/MOPE that stated: “I could after the political workshop understand more 
clearly  why  they  don’t  trust  us,  especially  the  people  that  have  been  in  prison.  I  have  always  
understood  why  we  don’t  trust  them,  but  now  I  can  see  why  they  don’t  trust  us; they have 
reasons that are legitimate”. 
 
Other findings indicate that some of the participants realized that Israeli and Palestinians to 
some extent have needs and goals that are mutually inclusive instead of exclusive.  
 
I think that the biggest change for me was new understanding about the wall, and not to just accept 
the  wall.  (…)  My  main  conclusion  is  that  today  it  is  good  to  have  the  separation  wall,  good  in  an  
ironically  way.  We  have  not  have  any  terrorist’s  attacks  in  three  years,  no  busses  have  exploded (..) 
On the other hand they are clogged up over there, and what today is seen as a solution will in 20 
years be even worse than it is today, in my eyes, Because the aggression and the frustration 
develops  to  be  even  more  extreme  (…).  That  was  the  main thing that I learnt in the seminar (Hadas 
IF/BB) 
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It may seem like that Hadas to some degree realized that the Israeli society couldn’t solve its 
security issues without giving Palestinians their freedom. These issues are to a great extent 
interlinked. It is reason to believe that this was something she realized after being exposed 
to Palestinian stories over how difficult their lives are due to the separation wall.  
 
7.1.4. Dialogue confirmed their prior views  
Some participants, mainly on the Israeli side with the exception of the Palestinian facilitator 
Noor PF/ BB, could not refer to any bigger changes in perceptions about the other side, due 
to the fact that they already knew  “that the other side is just as human as us” Noor PF/BB.   
These participants were the same people that had a background were parents already had 
some form of relationship with the other side, either through peace activities (Israeli side) 
or through business relations (Palestinian side). As outlined in section 6.2 their previous 
perceptions about the others were already modified, and no bigger changes in perceptions 
had therefore occurred. One might say that the Israeli participants had to some extent 
already embraced the Palestinian narrative prior to dialogue and were fighting on their 
behalf. What they referred as a change was that the conflict got a face due to the fact that 
they now know people they care about and worry about. 
 
It  wasn’t  changed  because  I  was  always  left  wing  and  I  was  always  into  believing  into  Human  Rights  
(…)  but what was changed was the personal relationship. You could always believe in the 
Palestinians as a word, that they have rights, but then when you meet them it is different. Then 
when you meet them they have faces, they have voices and they have names. And you meet them 
and they have their own stories and they have their own personal lives and I think what was 
changed was the personal feelings towards them (Hannah IF/PCFF). 
 
 
7.1.5. “They have changed, not me” 
The last pattern of personal change concerns the participants that claimed that the other 
side has changed, and not themselves. There were mainly the Palestinian men that 
expressed this point of view, however Mona PF/BB was also eager to explain how much the 
other side had changed. The majority of the participants that stated this were the same 
people that saw dialogue as a platform to educate the other side about the situation in the 
OPT. Therefore one might say that motivation and outcome of change is directly linked to 
each other. An example is Ilias PM/MOPE. On the question on whether he believes dialogue 
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has changed his view about the other side he answered: “Of  course,  yes.  (…).  Many  of  them  
have  changed  their  minds”. I asked    “…but  in  which  way  have  you  changed?“  He replied:  
 
I think all of them have learned about our situation in the camp, in the villages and in the city. We 
showed  them  some  pictures  in  the  first  meeting  and  it  was  the  first  time  for  them  to  see  it  (….)  and  
especially when they visited me and visited other Palestinians, then they saw it with their own eyes. 
Here they learned and heard from my wife, they smoke agila (water pipe), and they ate with us.  
 
Later I asked the same question. He answered: “No,  not  now,  but  maybe  in  the  future”.  
 
According to the Palestinian historian Salma Khadra Jayyusi (1999) is the Palestinian people 
very much attached to their nation, village and brotherhood. When Palestinians think of 
themselves it is a common trend to think of “us”, the people that have been terrorized, 
tortured and abandoned from the world. Further on she argues that the Palestinians are 
very much linked to the plight of preserving their own identity and to continue the struggle 
of liberating their land (Jayyusi 1999). It is reason to assume that it is difficult, and not 
preferable, to turn against this collective identity based on collective struggle. However, if 
they can define dialogue as another way of resistance they are in a better position to 
legitimize their involvement in dialogue, to themselves, and also to the fellow people within 
the society. This is in line with what Abu-Nimer and Lazarus (2007)argue; that being a part 
of dialogue groups can serve as a meaningful contribution to their community if they can 
refer to changes in the Israeli attitudes. If not, it may be regarded as a betrayal of their 
national identity to be involved in such groups. In a way it offers them a protection against 
criticism. As Mona PF/BB stated during her interview:  
 
When I meet Israeli I believe that I  don’t  betray  my  people,  but  that  I’m  dealing with them. It is not 
acceptable for my people that I meet them, but when I discuss with them and when I can tell them 
that we have change some of their ideas, and that dialogue is helpful and that it is working, then 
some  of  them  are  accepting  it,  it  is  ok  (…). 
 
By referring to changes in attitudes and opinions among the Israelis is therefore a way of 
acknowledging that dialogue is useful and valuable. It might be that they also have 
experienced changes in own perceptions, however due to the group spirit of resistance, 
their focus was much more directed on expressing the changes that have happened with 
the other side. This may also be one of the reasons for why the word resistance was 
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repeatedly used by all of the interviewed Palestinian men. Instead of using weapons they 
claimed they were fighting by the power of communication.  
 
7.1.6. The symbolic value of dialogue  
As described above, all the interviewed participants referred to some achievement and 
positive outcome at a personal level. It is therefore reasonable to assume that many of the 
participants do experience a significant personal value of dialogue. Some participants even 
claimed that just the fact that they manage to meet under such harsh circumstances has a 
great success and value in itself. Daniel IF/ MOPE is quoted: “The  success  is  in  fact  that  
dialogue is happening, that you bring people together to talk and to get human relations 
between  each  other  and  an  understanding  in  where  the  both  side  come  from”. In addition, 
the positive changes that they have experienced during the sessions might help the 
participants dealing with the difficult reality, in the sense that they can see some results of 
their work. The majority of the participants on both sides claimed that they see no options 
beside dialogue, and they therefore continue their efforts despite the ongoing cycle of 
violence. Ali PM/PCFF claimed:  “There  is  no  alternative  way  to  dialogue.  Or  the  alternative  
is obvious, keep killing each other, keeping the violence, and keep loosing our lives, our 
minds,  and  our  future”. An Israeli example is Elisheba IF/PCFF that stated:  
 
There is no alternative other than dialogue; you can never give up that idea now when they are my 
friends. If I had not known them it would be easier, but now I could never abandon them, knowing 
that they will be left to such disgusting lives, my consciousness will never ever aloud it. And it helps 
me as well getting up in the morning knowing that I am doing my bit and not sitting back in the 
corner doing nothing. Who the hell am I to talk if I do nothing about it?  
 
What she expressed was similar to many of the other Israeli responses. They described that 
the personal friendship with Palestinians have given them a greater responsibility to try to 
do something with the situation. As the Israeli facilitator Rachel IF/BB stated: “Occupation 
relies  on  objectifying  people,  and  then  you  also  don’t  care  about  people.  If  you  don’t  become  
emotionally  involved  in  something  you  don’t  give  a  fuck  about  it”.  Dialogue is a platform 
where the Israelis at least feel that they are doing a little bit, which might help them to feel 
little less guilty about the pain and injustice the Israeli occupation are causing the 
Palestinian people.  
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In addition, there might be a greater symbolic value of dialogue, which is not necessarily 
discovered and expressed by the participants, for example through giving a positive impact 
on their peers. If the participants in dialogue groups communicate positive attitudes 
towards such interactions, it is possible that this may contribute to the reduction of hostile 
attitudes and fear towards the other within their family and closest social network. As an 
effect of the great stigmatization of such joint activities some people might fear 
communicating what they are doing. Mona PF/BB for instance was telling many of her 
friends that she was joining a women conference, and not a joint workshop with Israelis. 
However, findings on prior stereotypes and motivations might indicate the opposite. As 
seen previously, the majority of the participants with less negative stereotypes about the 
other prior to meetings have had one or several positive role models in their lives. In 
addition, when doing family visits during interviews I occasionally had the opportunity to 
talk to other family members. Some of the children had followed in their  parents’  footsteps,  
and could refer to dialogue workshops for children and youths in which they had 
participated. In addition, the majority of the participants stated that they had started with 
dialogue as a result of an invitation received from friends or other family members. This 
might be an indication of that to some degree such ripple effects are actually taking place. 
Several of the interviewed participants did also mention women as an important 
component of dialogue, explicitly for this purpose. They claimed that mothers do –especially 
in the more traditional societies - have an important effect on their children. As Kefaya 
outlined during her interview:  
 
You know, the women are mothers of the home and teachers in the schools, so the women can do a 
lot of things. So if you are a mother and you have kids, and if you tell your kids good things about the 
other they will love him and be good, but opposite, they will hate me. So I think that the women are 
the main person in changing.  
 
Reaching out to the women can therefore be a way of reaching into the families. 
 
 
7.2. Perceived effectiveness on the political context  
As seen described in 6.2, the majority claimed to have higher hopes for the dialogue groups, 
other than changing perceptions on a personal level. As already outlined they also want to 
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influence the overall political reality in their region. Due to the fact that the conflicting 
reality still is unchanged, a few therefore felt that the dialogue encounters had little effect 
other than on a personal level.  
 
The effect of dialogue on the outside political situation  Palestinian  Israeli  
Dialogue has an effect on a personal level, but cannot change 
the overall political situation  
2 3 
Dialogue has the potential of having an effect on a personal 
level as well as on the outside political reality.  
9 10 
Table 7: The effect of dialogue on the outside political situation 
 
As shown in Table 7, only five of the participants had a hope to see the contribution of 
grassroots dialogue as a means to end the conflict. Instead they expressed disappointment 
with the reduced ability they experience that they have to change the overall political 
reality. They believe that the conflict needs to be resolved by the politicians, as well as by 
the international environment. Grassroots dialogue is not going to contribute to that, even 
if their overall personal experience with dialogue was positive. Mahmoud PM/MOPE 
exemplifies, claiming that the conflict can only be solved by the government, and not by the 
people. “They  decide,  not  us”. When I asked him If he believed that grassroots dialogue in 
some way can influence the government, he answered: “  no,  absolutely  not”. When asked 
why he then committed to dialogue if he does not believe it can help solving the conflict, he 
answered: “(…)  My  mission  is  to  protect  my  homeland  and  serve  my  people  (…)  We  can  with 
the  work  convince  soldiers  to  be  with  good  behavior  at  the  check  point  and  road  blocks”.  His 
mission with dialogue is therefore not to end the conflict, but to try to create it less painful 
for the Palestinian people, by making the occupation more human. This was also articulated 
among  the  Palestinian  and  Israeli  woman  connected  to  the  “failed  dialogue  group”.    Ariell  
IF/FD argued:  
 
We wanted to go beyond. We wanted to achieve something big, we wanted to change Israeli mind 
and say look they are our neighbors,  (…)  It  is  very  nice  to  sit  together  and  talk  and  how  is  your  child,  
and bla bla you know, but it would not come any closer to a solution.  (…).  I  think  we  were  very  naive. 
We thought that if we could only bring a lot of Israeli into Palestinian families they could feel 
hospitality  and  stop  being  afraid,  and  it  didn’t  happened.  Like  we  thought  that  if  we  could  only  bring  
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hundreds of people and they will just continue by themselves, and then it eventually will be 
thousands of these groups and meetings,  but  the  small  scale  didn’t  get  large.     
 
She expressed that the Israelis in the group were still willing to meet, and it was eventually 
the Palestinian women that decided to stop the meetings. She is further quoted:  
 
We have trust and friendship in the group, but we are not capable in doing anything that is 
meaningful. I think that the dialogue stopped when the Palestinian found out that they should do 
something more meaningful with their time. That talking to us was very nice, but not useful, it would 
not get them any state. 
 
This point of view was supported by Hanin PF/FD, which realized that she rather wanted to 
use her time in trying to strengthen the Palestinian people, instead of continue with 
dialogue. She was frustrated about the victimhood and the violence of her society and 
found it extremely hard to sustain the confidence in dialogue. One of the obstacles 
concerned the normalization and the challenges with the increased level of resistance to 
joint meetings after the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000. The other factor was related to the fact 
that she had realized that it was much more effective to continue the struggle for peace on 
unilateral level. She expressed that there exist so many fractions and tensions between 
different groups in Palestine, especially between Hamas and Fatah. If peace will eventually 
come they have to strengthen the Palestinian side of the population that seek territorial 
compromise with Israel, and hence weaken the side that is fighting for a Greater Palestine. 
This, she expressed, was much more efficient, than to sit and talk and make friends with the 
other side.  
 
 
7.3. Challenges and improvement to dialogue  
While  some  were  skeptical  about  grassroots  dialogue’s  ability  to  change  the  political  reality,  
the Table 7 indicates that the majority claimed that this is possible under certain conditions. 
There are some structural reasons for grassroots dialogue having limited impact on the 
political situation. Despite the difficult reality, they had not given up hope in dialogue, and 
referred to some conditions that they were trying to improve in order to achieve a more 
efficient dialogue encounter.  There were some obstacles that repeatedly were being 
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expressed in many of the interviews to be the reasons for the limited impact dialogue has 
on the outside political context. These are discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.3.1. Increase the number of people   
The majority of the participants claimed that the dialogue groups had failed to change the 
political reality, due to the fact that they have still not reached a significant number of 
participants. If they only can expose more people to dialogue, more will change their view 
about the other, and hence ideally place pressure on the government. If enough people get 
involved, the government will no longer have any choice than to listen to the grassroots. 
The quantity of people protesting from below may therefore be considered as a very 
important factor. As Hannah IF/ PCFF is quoted:  
 
There are many interests to keep the conflict  going,  and  that  is  only  why  we  don’t  have  peace  yet.  
Like such as in Irland and Apartheid in South Africa. Like there eventually enough people screamed 
that  they  couldn’t  live  like  that  anymore.  It  took  several  years,  but  it  came  down  and  the  
governments  couldn’t  keep  their  interests  anymore,  because  people  were  screaming.  But  until  then  
it  was  very  easy  to  keep  the  conflict  going,  and  I  think  here  is  the  same  (…).   
 
Another example may be Mona (PM/ BB) saying: “I  cannot  say  that  the  dialogue  was  very  
successful, but we cannot say that it was nothing. For me I look more positive, and I think 
that if it would have just be more of these groups, then the generations coming after me will 
be much more open”.    
 
This is in line with what Saunder addresses in his multilayered approach of peacebuilding, 
the public peace process (Saunder 2001). As described in chapter 2, the empowerment of 
changing their community from below were addressed as outmost necessary. However, 
several of the participants also added cooperation between the grassroots and the leaders 
as an important factor. Two of the Israeli women in PCFF were very eager to express that 
despite the mass of the grassroots level activities they will never have the power to squeeze 
their leaders into any negotiation. What they can do is to prepare the ground for peace, but 
in the end they will need strong leaders with some specific qualities.  
 
For things to really change I think that the two people need those kind of leaders who can do it, it is 
not enough with the grass-root.  You  will  need  leadership  who  will  not  be  popular  (…). The conflict is 
just going on and no one is brave enough to stop it. We need tremendously brave leaders, and we 
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don’t  have  that  today.  (…).  Peace  need  good  leaders,  brave,  but  also  the grassroots. It is a to-ways 
system.  Even  you  can  have  people  like  Nelson  Mandela,  but  if  people  aren’t  ready  then  you  are  stuck  
(…)  (Miriam/PCFF).  
 
 This  can  be  in  line  with  Lederach’s  pyramid  that points out that peacebuilding is not an 
arena limited to only one level of society, but that all levels are interconnected and mutually 
dependent (Lederach 2004). What Lederach also points to in the apex, level one of his 
pyramid, is the importance of reaching a great variation of different types of societal actors 
in the society. This leads to the next critical point that was addressed by several over the 
participants, which is the selection bias.  
7.3.2. Selection bias  
Dialogue groups may be regarded to a great degree as self-selected. As outlined above the 
participants had received an invitation to join dialogue encounters from family, friends, or 
they had found the encounters through a website. An issue that might be rising from this is 
the question about balance. Dialogue may then quickly become a tool for those who are 
already willing to meet. The issue about self-selection is by Cursch, Visser and Johnson 
(2004) raised as one of the challenges behind the lacking effect of dialogue encounters that 
were conducted in Northern Ireland. They expressed that this should be seen in connection 
to the fact that encounters did not reach the more extreme members of the society, which 
were the ones that most likely would have benefited the most from participation. Several of 
the interviewed participants did raise the issue about not reaching the more extreme 
people on both sides, claiming that this may be regarded as one of the greatest challenges. 
Rashid PM/IEA is quoted:  
 
We are surely not successful in bringing people from Palestinian extreme Hamas right now. I am 
trying, but I have only success with people from left from like Fattah movement, but extreme Jihad 
Hamas, I think that they believe in dialogue but not between people to people but between leader 
to leader. (..) Next year I will focus more on right people. I think that they can and must sit together 
(…). 
 
On the other hand, Cass R. Sustein argues in the book “Going to Extremes”  (2009) that 
bringing people from sharply opposing views may increase, rather than reduce the 
polarization. This is due to the fact that dialogue needs participants that are willing to open 
up to one another, instead of holding on to their hatred and anger. Further on he claims 
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that one must first reduce the conflict before dialogue can have the ability to reach a wider 
specter of people.  Several interviewed participants mentioned that one way of reaching a 
wider specter of people is to work with the younger generation, through among others 
obligatory dialogue meetings in school. This was especially something that was repeatedly 
mentioned by the interviewed participants from the PCFF. Ali PM/PCFF is quoted:  
 
When they are 16 and 17 years old everyone will think about how to fight the Israeli, how to become 
a suicide bomber, because of the occupation. Other side how to become a soldier, to secure my 
state and build it, and kill the Palestinians.  
 
PCFF is already facilitating public dialogue activities in high schools. Two forum 
representatives, one Israeli and one Palestinian, are visiting different classrooms in Israel, 
East Jerusalem and West Bank. There they are talking to students about the possibility of 
peace and reconciliation, through their own personal narratives. Ali claimed that these 
types of dialogue meetings might be the most important work that the PCFF is doing, due to 
the fact that here they are reaching a wide specter of youth that often have great variations 
of backgrounds and ideologies. High school lectures may be the first meeting they have with 
the personal narrative of the other side. As a counter voice to the work of Cass R. Sustein, 
Ali claims that everyone actually can be able to sit together and listen and talk, also the 
more extremist people. The question is rather on how the dialogue is conducted:  
 
Ok I can tell you that I can sit in the classroom in Israel, and say that you took my land and you killed 
my father and I have been in jail because of you and put all the blame on them, but that is no kind of 
dialogue. But I can be in a different way. I can start to say that I want to tell you my personal story of 
what  actually  happened  to  me.  (.…  ).  We  don’t  teach  them  about  the  occupation,  because when you 
rather tell them the personal story it is like different. You have to be clever, you have to play and 
deal with the minds and take people on a personal journey with you. This works all the time.   
 
Hannah IF/PCFF can serve as another example:  
 
I think the lectures are very important because kids have stereotypes and if like teacher will speak to 
them  about  it  someone  will  say  that  they  doesn’t  have  personal  stories  and  the  stereotypes  will  just  
grow, and I think that the lectures they hear a very personal story. Many kids in the end have the 
same opinions, but even they can listen to the topic just because this are bereaved parents that have 
lost someone very close and they have dignity for this. PCFF is admired and respected, because they 
lost people that gave something to the country. So children still with all the stereotypes they can sit 
and they can listen to the bereaved parents talking, and because of that they also have to do it with 
the Palestinians as well. And suddenly they see a Palestinian that has a name, sit on a chair just like 
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the Israeli, and has his own story about loosing someone, and suddenly maybe they can relate to 
him. He is a human being.   
 
PCFF may be in a unique position of facilitating public lectures in classrooms, due to the fact 
that people seem to have more respect for people in bereavement. While PCFF is able to 
conduct such meetings it might be more difficult for other dialogue groups to do the same. 
First of all it is reason to believe that it will be more difficult to get the permission to 
conduct such lectures in the classrooms, and it might also be harder to make the students 
listening. Anyhow, PCFF reaches around 20.000 Israeli and Palestinian students every year 
(PCFF 2012). This may contribute to some changes in perceptions among people that 
normally would not have taken part in dialogue.  
 
7.3.3. Creating continuity despite the violence on the ground  
The Israeli and Palestinian conflict is colored by endless circles of violence on the ground, 
which has according to Bassiouni (2003) a severe negative impact on the spirit of 
cooperation among the participants in dialogue. In his article he is using the violence 
connected to the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000 as an example, claiming that it led to great despair 
and increased dehumanization on both sides, with sever loss of hope and confidence about 
the other part (Bassiouni 2003). Many Palestinians felt forsaken by the fact that their Israeli 
partners remained silent, while many Israeli felt betrayed by the Palestinian suicide attacks 
(Wurfel 2003). The dilemma of performing dialogue in an ongoing violent conflict was 
reflected upon by several of the interviewed participants. Several claimed that they 
occasionally did question whether or not they should continue with dialogue.  One example 
is the failed dialogue group that broke down after the escalation of violence caused by the 
Al Aqsa Intifada. Hanin PF/FD stated that she and also the other Palestinians in the group 
felt betrayed and humiliated by the Israeli, and eventually they could not continue to meet. 
She claimed, “It is too hard with dialogue when you are not proud and strong anymore, and 
when the Israeli  humiliates  us”.   This cause of event reflects how trust and cooperation in an 
ongoing conflict is very hard to sustain.  
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The Gaza war in January 2009 was also something that was repeatedly mentioned as an 
event that had caused obstacles for several of the dialogue groups in Israel and Palestine. 
Michael IM/MOPE is quoted:  
 
During  the  war  we  couldn’t  meet,  it  was  so  hard.  The  Israeli  turned  totally  pro  Israel,  saying  that  
peace will come only after the Palestinian women will care more about their children than to kill 
Israeli. I got furious when they said that, and some other in the group also got furious, but this is 
something that happened in the group. Like one of them said that we cannot meet in the war, but 
later. To meet now will be ridiculous hypocrites. 
 
This is an example of a tendency that often occurs in times of conflict. As described in 
section 2.2, people tend to develop stronger group memberships when there is time of 
insecurity and violence. This is due to the fact  that  when  people  fear  that  their  own  group’s  
security is under greater threat it is a tendency to withdraw into safe in-groups. Under 
violent threats, such as seen in the Gaza war, it is possible that the differences between the 
in and out groups may again be overstated, and hence societal beliefs around victimization 
and dehumanization may find new grounding. Even members of PCFF mentioned that the 
war in Gaza troubled their dialogue interactions, even if their relationships are by many of 
the members being expressed as deep and emotional. This was more dominant among the 
Palestinian members than by the Israeli members, which again may have relation to the 
asymmetrical power relation. Kefaya PM/PCFF is quoted:  
 
You know, the most difficult moment was during the war in Gaza. That time we cannot accept each 
other. While we were working we were doing a lot to achieve something, and then came the war. 
That time we faced a lot of problems, then also my mother did not accept to meet Israeli, and most 
other women  didn’t  accept  that  we  met  and  did  something.     
 
Yet, in the midst of ongoing violence members of PCFF continue to meet even after the 
setback of the Gaza war in 2009, and the members expressed it as that they do not have any 
other alternatives than to continue their work.   
 
The discussion around the use of violence was to some extent two folded. All of the 
participants stated that violence does not lead to peace, and should be stopped on both 
sides. However, when talking about the Gaza war in 2009 and the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000 
some of the interviewed participants on both sides did -to some extent-withdraw back to 
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the more mainstream narrative regarding violence. This was especially visible amongst the 
participants in BB. All of the Palestinians stated that the rockets attacks and suicide attacks 
are something that they do not support, however on the other hand some of them argued 
that they understand why it is happening. The Palestinian violence is only a consequence of 
the Israeli occupation and the pessimism around the possibilities of having a better future.  
 
Palestinians who die are in our eyes looked at as Martyrs, because they have died for something 
good, they die for their country. We tried to tell them that Muslims who die as Martyr they go to 
heaven, but the Israeli were very angry saying that they were only terrorists. But some of the 
Martyrs are really heroes for us. We cannot say that all Martyrs are terrorists because first of all we 
are defending our country. We cannot sit down and do nothing. It is like when you are eating 
something, you cannot say ok take it. You fight for it. (Mona PF/BB).  
 
On the Israeli side they were all against the Israeli military violence directed towards the 
Palestinians. However, many of them stressed the fact that the Israelis have grown a deep 
fear for being killed by bombs and rocket attacks, and they wanted the Palestinians to 
realize how the impact of terrorism has on the their public. Majority of the Israeli 
participants did not support the security fences and the military checkpoints. However, as 
the situation was right now, some of them did not see any other solution to the Palestinian 
violence.  
 
I think that Israeli that live here and are growing up here have seen so many bombs in Tel Aviv and I 
know people that have been killed and injured, so I think that everybody develop this genuinely fear 
from terrorists and from Arabs. You can go on the bus and you can see someone entering the bus 
and they look like Arabs and  you  don’t  know  if  he  is  going  to  blow himself up. Therefore I have this 
fear of getting killed, that someone will kill me from the street (Hannah IF/PCFF).  
 
 
 
7.3.4. Long-term commitment  
The length of the five dialogue groups varied widely, all from weekend workshops (MOPE), 
weekly meetings of two weeks (BB), to a more long-term commitment for more than a year 
(PCFF, FD and IEA). From several holds there is a preference a more long-term commitment, 
rather than short-term meetings (Hurtado & Schoem 2001). This is due to the fact that 
dialogue must be regarded as a process rather than an event. It is only over an extended 
period of time that participants are able to build trusting relationships, which may survive 
the outside pressure of stigmatization towards dialogue. Several of the participants of BB 
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expressed frustration over the lack of long-term commitment to the program. This was 
especially visible among three of the participants that had BB as their only dialogue 
experience. As Zeina PF/BB expressed:  
 
The problem begins when you come back. You have plans, you want to work for peace (..) but by the 
time  everything  is  going  away,  I  don’t  know  why…  you  will  be  with  people  that  tells  you,  no  it  is  not  
right and you discover that it will be very hard to be friends (..) you are in a conflict with yourselves, 
whether to be with them, or not. The reality here is really hard.   
 
The Israeli participant Hadas IF/BB expressed a similar challenge: “You come back and it is 
weird because you think that you made so many steps forward and you see that everything 
here is the same”.   The quotes do to some degree confirm the argumentation given by Sylvi 
Hurtado (2001) that there are no shortcuts to the benefit of long-term engagement and 
commitment. The collective narratives that refuse dialogue are as previously outlined very 
strong, especially on the Palestinians side, and one might assume that it is constantly being 
reinforced by the conflict. This is also the conclusion of Phillip Hammack’s work on 
narratives by Israeli and Palestinian youths were he claims that the identity categorization 
quickly can be eradiated by the structural reality of conflict (Hammack 2011).  
 
Changes in attitudes demand time, and only after a short-term dialogue the ripple effect to 
the wider society might therefore be limited. There is reason to believe that many 
participants do not have a social network at home supporting dialogue, and there is also a 
danger of returning to their prior views after a period of time. However, a counter voice 
might be the fact that two of the Palestinian participants that have been engaged in 
dialogue for many years actually started with a short–term commitment in an abroad 
workshop. They claimed that they joined the seminar out of curiosity and possible to travel 
abroad, and ended up being very engaged in dialogue. For the participants in BB it is fair to 
assume that if given a chance to join another dialogue encounter in the future, the positive 
experience from BB might make it easier for them to participate in new challenges.  
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7.4. Future outlook – participants imagining peace  
All of the participants had reflected upon their perception on approaches to promote peace 
and had a clear preference on how the best way to live together should be. Some were 
connected to a two-state solution, while others were arguing for a one-state solution. This 
will be discussed in following sections.  
 
7.4.1. Two states for two people   
Two states for two peoples has for a period of time been the suggested solution for those 
who seek a peace that includes both peoples. This was also an agreed upon issue by the 
majority of the interviewed participants. This solution addresses the needs of both sides, 
where Palestine represents a homeland for the Palestinian people, and Israel represents a 
homeland of the Jewish people. In order to make it possible, almost all of them mentioned 
that they have to make an end to the Israeli occupation on the Palestinian territories. 
However, the two Israeli participants living in the Israeli settlement were more reluctant 
about calling it an occupation. They felt that they had a right to live on this territory in the 
sense that they have a deep spiritual connection to  the  region.  “I  don’t  feel  that  I  am  taking  
Arab  territory  by  living  here,  because  it  wasn’t  like  that  we  tore down houses or anything. It 
was just deserts” (Beth IF/IEA). However, all except two of the Israeli participants, expressed 
their condemnations to the Israeli occupation in OPT, and wanted to make an end to it. The 
Palestinian participants also saw this as the only options for a future peace to find place:  “I  
tell them many times, we accept you as a state. We ask you to give back what you occupied 
from  us,  and  let  us  build  an  independent  state  beside  you.  We  don’t  say  what  we  said  in  the  
past, like we want to throw you to  the  sea  (…)” (Ilias PM/MOPE).    
 
When asked what the separation of the two states should be like, most of the participants 
were unclear. Several participants on both sides had no answer to the question claiming 
that it is the responsibility of the politicians and not the people to agree on this. However, 
preference suggested by four of the Palestinian participants was to turn back to the exact 
1967 border, and to make a fair division of Jerusalem. Others again, both Palestinians and 
Israeli, said that sticking exactly to the 1967 border is not realistic. Some exchange of land 
must be done, and three Israeli participants especially referred to some of the highly 
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populated Israeli settlements on the West Bank. However, both Mahmoud PM/MOPE and 
and Ali PM/PCFF were skeptical to this, because they were afraid of what kind of impact this 
will have for them, due to the fact that two of the largest settlements are separating the 
West Bank from East Jerusalem. Mahmoud argued that it is an obstacle for a future 
exchange explaining: “Cannot  change  land,  especially  not  around  Jerusalem.  (…)  Male 
Adumim settlement and Gush Shalom settlement will separate Jerusalem from the West 
Bank.  (…).  How  we  can  build  our  state  with  these  settlers  and  settlements?” The Israeli 
participant Michael IM/MOPE argued that the compromises of land must be something 
Palestinians are going to gain from, while Israel on the other hand has to suffer:  
 
Israel has to give up a lot, because in the eyes of Palestinians, the Israeli will always be the oppressor 
and  the  attacker  (…).  I  don’t  think  that  they  can  reconcile  with  themselves  of  what  have  happened  
unless  they  see  that  we  pay  a  huge  price.  (…)  It  must  come  from  the  Israeli  (..)  If  it  comes  as  a  
pressure from the Palestinians it is not going to play the role. It should be an offer.  
 
The separation wall was also mentioned as an obstacle to a future two-state solution. 
Several of the Palestinians stated clearly that the separation wall, roadblocks and the 
checkpoints within the West Bank must be removed in order to build a sustainable state. 
Rashid PM/IEA is quoted:  
 
People born now see the wall, see the Check Points, see that Jerusalem is Israeli area, and maybe 
this generation will never visit Jerusalem. That will feed back badly. It will create a new hate-
generation. I always say to the Israeli in the meetings that it is the wall that create Palestinians 
hating Israeli. First step is to end the occupation, tear down the wall and all the Check Points. And 
then build trust. That is it! Then you will see something new. 
 
The majority of the Israeli on the other hand were skeptical to this. On one hand they could 
see how the checkpoints and the separation wall create great problems for the average 
Palestinian. On the other hand they fear for their own security if totally removing it. Almost 
all of them were willing to adjust it back to the 1967 border, or move it to a negotiated 
border, but not totally remove it. As Hadas IF/ BB was saying:  
 
The last thing I want is terrorist attacks. I have two kids to be in danger, very egoistic from my point 
of  view.  I  don’t  want  the  wall,  it  is  horrible  in  all  objectives,  but  there  is  right  now  no  other  solution  
to stop the terrorist attacks. I believe that the separation-wall will go down one day. I am optimistic. 
Of  course  it  has  to  go  to  the  green  line,  or  maybe  it  doesn’t  have  to  be  exact.  (…)  And  yes  I  do  believe  
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it should be a border, maybe a wall. Even in Mexico there is a wall, but not like this. Not a wall that 
goes  into  little  houses.  (…). 
 
7.4.2. Skepticism towards a two-state solution 
However, there existed skepticism towards a two-state solution between five of the 
participants, based on two different explanations. The Israeli settlers stating that the Holy 
Land cannot be divided into a political two-state solution addressed one of the explanations. 
They must rather seek peaceful existence in one single peace of land. As Vivian IF/IEA 
argued: “This  can  be  a  safe  place  for  Jews  and be a Jewish Homeland, but it can also be a 
Palestinian Homeland, it can be like both at the same time. It is not anything wrong to have 
a  homeland  for  both  countries  (…)”. The other reason given for their lacking trust in a two-
state solution was related to the changes on the ground, such as the continuing expansion 
of Israeli settlements on the West Bank, their economically dependence, security issues as 
well as geographical issues. These together with other factors had made a two-state 
solution practically impossible. Instead they must rather be discussing a bi-national state. It 
occurred mostly on the Israeli side, but also one Palestinian participant showed this 
skepticism. Ali PM/ PCFF stated:  
 
No chance we can do a two-state solution. Things on the ground are so hard. The water, the electric, 
economic, it will be so hard for the Palestinians to do a state. And then it is the right of return of the 
refugees. It is 7 million refugees, what can we do with them when they still are refugees. It is a small 
land. How can we do two states? Maybe we can make two states now, and after 50 years make it 
together. Or maybe we can call it Israelistinian.  
 
Ariell IF/FD expressed similar skepticism. She also believes that the practical challenges to a 
two-state solution are too substantial for it to actually be working in practice. However, two 
states was something she ideally preferred:  “You  have  what  is  preferable  and  what  is  
realistic. What is preferable is to have a two-state solution, but I feel we have created a 
situation where it is impossible for us. All the settlers living there, I don’t  think  it  is  practical,  
but  it  is  preferable,  because  both  sides  really  wants  it”.  The Israeli facilitator Jacob IM/MOPE 
explained how the only realistic solution must be based on cooperation between the two 
people, due to the fact that a complete separation will turn into a disaster:  
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I  cannot  force  you  to  marry  me  with  peaceful  means  if  you  don’t  want  to  marry  me.  One  state  is  
then not an option. Two states is not an option either, because that is a complete divorce. 
Impossible. The only thing that will work is two cooperative states. But the reality is that we have to 
move very fast, because the settlers they are dictating the terms on the ground, it will in the end be 
impossible to evacuate them and the 2 states will then not be an option anymore.  
 
 
7.4.3. There are people to talk to on the other side  
The findings above outline different ways of approaching peace, some based on a one-state 
solution and others on a two-state solution. However, despite the differences in how to 
pursue peace, they all expressed the wish to live non-violently with both people present in 
the territory. This is opposite to the two peaceful visions explained in chapter 3, which 
represents a mirroring victory of one side over the other. There are people on both sides 
that still believe that the land belong to them exclusively, where the one side can only win if 
the other side looses, which is often referred to as a zero-sum struggle. As seen in the above 
findings, this was not the case among the participants interviewed for this research. In 
various ways they aired options were both sides live together peacefully. This might serve as 
a positive contribution for the participants involved, in the sense that they meet people on 
the other side expressing the same wishes as them. Several of the interviewed participants 
described this as a positive discovery, due to the fact that they often are being told 
otherwise by their society.  Miriam IF/PCFF can serve as an example saying:   
 
People say there is no one to talk to and I can say that well, there is 200 Palestinians that you can 
talk to, and I have met and I have spoken to these people and you see wonderful Palestinian women 
that love you dearly and they want something different than war. It has changed me because I know 
that there are definitely people on every side in every conflict and if you want you can find them 
that will think the same as you.  
 
The participants interviewed for this research have developed a language of common 
ground, where there is made room for both people in their hopes for the future. According 
to Bruce E. Wexler does in fact 75% of the Israeli and Palestinian population support a peace 
where both people are included (Wexler 2007). However, the problem is that there is often 
the extremist minority that is winning the war by serving the public with ideas of violence, 
hatred and mutual denial of the other side’s  identity (Wexler 2007). It is reason to believe 
that the extremists are controlling the terms of thinking and discussions. A central part of 
the conflict is about mistrust to the other side, a mistrust that is often not based on facts 
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but rather on myths. The question is how can the people that do believe in peace that 
includes both people -such as the participants interviewed for this thesis - translate their 
voice into a genuine public opinion, so that it is not the extremists that set the agenda for 
peace, but rather the moderates.  
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8. Conclusions  
 
This thesis has portrayed how Israeli and Palestinian participants perceive the value and 
effect of grassroots level dialogue. The discussion was based on findings received from 
participants belonging to five different groups.  Some were influenced by the human-
relations tradition, while others were influenced by conflict-resolution tradition. Groups also 
varied in timeframe, and in what type of people that were connected to them. Answers 
given from the participants gave a double-sided picture of the effectiveness of dialogue that 
was both pessimistic as well as optimistic. On one hand they could refer to an effect on the 
personal level, while on the other hand experiences of disappointment was addressed due 
to the unchangeable reality of intractable conflict.  
 
Conducting grassroots dialogue in an ongoing violent conflict has both physical as well as 
psychological barriers. What makes dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian participants 
even harder is the structural asymmetry that exists between them, where one side is the 
occupier and the other side is being occupied. Different realities often result in different 
motivations and expectations by dialogue, which was also the case for the participants 
interviewed as part of this research. There existed great differences among participants’ 
perceptions around whether one should discuss the difficult conflicting issues that separate 
the two peoples, or whether to steer away from them and rather focus on creating an 
atmosphere of equality based on their commonalities. Due to the asymmetry more 
Palestinian than Israelis expressed the need for political discussions, or more specifically to 
articulate how they are suffering due to the Israeli occupation. There is reason to believe 
that if dialogue is to be an effective tool for structural change, one must recognize the 
various needs and concerns that the different participants are carrying, and especially from 
the weaker part. Ignoring the needs and living conditions of participating Palestinians in 
comparison to Israelis might create frustrations and also reduce Palestinians ability to gain 
support for their attendance in dialogue among people in their own societies.  
 
All interviewed participants proclaimed a positive value of dialogue, among others by 
gaining greater knowledge around conflicting topics, and/or by developing deep and 
meaningful friendship with the other side. What seemed to be a merging tendency was that 
98  
they all appreciated the positive value of finding people on the other side that were 
embracing the same wish for the future. They all want to live side by side in peace, a peace 
that includes and respects both people. In this sense one might conclude that reconciliation 
actually does happen in small ways.  
 
On the other hand there were expressed frustrations to dialogue and its limited impact on 
the political reality. At the heart of this research is the assumption that a resolution of 
intractable conflicts can only be effective through multilayered efforts that addresses both 
peace agreements at the state level as well as the psychosocial dimensions that adjust 
negative stereotypes and prejudice among people at the grassroots. Theories on intractable 
conflict suggest that ordinary people play an important role in the overall structural 
transformation of the conflict. Israeli and Palestinian grassroots dialogue groups have 
existed for many years, but the positive effect on a personal level has not yet succeeded to 
generalize to the macro level of the whole society. However, participants suggested several 
reasons for why it has not yet happened, such as the limited ability to embrace a broader 
specter of people in both societies. Another factor is that grassroots dialogue is very much 
dependent on whether the political structures on the macro level is ready for reconciliation. 
At this moment participants claim that the politicians and the civil society are working 
against each other instead of together. The effect grassroots dialogue has on the political 
situation might at this moment seem small. However, this does not mean that dialogue 
cannot have a great impact on the Israeli and Palestinian political reality in the future.  
 
Many of the courageous people interviewed for this research continue year after year their 
effort of reaching out to the other side in the conflict, in order to mobilize the two peoples 
for a sustainable peace. This is done despite the endless circle of violence in region, and that 
for sure gives glimmer of hope.  
 
 
8.1. Limitations and avenues for further research  
Due to the scope of this thesis and the limitations of the empirical data, many questions 
regarding dialogue groups and its value and effect are left unanswered. An area that needs 
further investigation is a more narrow focus on the limits of the effectiveness of 
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reconciliation-aimed dialogues that are conducted in a situation of conflict. In light of this it 
might be valuable to suggest further research on three different topics.  
 
First of all it would be valuable to conduct similar research studies in other geographic areas 
where there exist intractable conflicts over identities, and were grassroots dialogue has 
been taken in use. Another valuable area for further investigation is to generate more 
knowledge on the perceptions of ordinary people not involved in dialogue. This also 
includes the perceptions of people that consciously stigmatize voluntary social contact, in 
order to better understand their reasons. The last suggestion is to compare grassroots 
dialogue with peace processes taken on the state level. This thesis has only attempted to 
look at dialogue setting from the viewpoint of the grassroots. However - as outlined by 
many of the interviewed participants- the grassroots is very dependent on the actions taken 
by the policymakers. Therefore it would be interesting to conduct further research on the 
interaction between grassroots and their leadership in order to get a better insight into how 
these two levels are/ or are not cooperating. This may give the researcher a better 
understanding of the possibilities for more efficient ways of cooperation at different levels 
in order to achieve a sustainable peace in the region.  
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